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Torts and Just Compensation: Some
Personal Reflections
By DATE W BROEDER*
I. Introduction
BRIEFLY stated, the broad purpose here is to explore and hopefully
at least in some measure to explain some of the complex interrelation-
sups between the law of torts and the just compensation clause of the
fifth amendment and its numerous state constitutional analogues. The
introduction is extended. The nature of the various. problems involved
requires this, as does the unconventional nature of the article's overall
approach.
The subject was chosen for several reasons, but the main one, let
it be made clear, is intensely personal. I have now taught torts for ten
years, and no part of the course has more persistently confounded, nri-
tated and frustrated my students and me over the years than this one.
It is -a plague, a pedagological nightmare. It consumes enormous
chunks of class time and, unless somehow summarily checked, cancer-
ously bores into large areas of any conventional torts curriculum.
Of course, there is another side. The subject magnetically, emg-
matically attracts. Complexity always challenges, and there are many
challenges of this sort here. Obvious and subtle questions of policy
abound, and there is enough in a technical way to delight the most
dedicated and sophisticated distinction-drawer. Also, there are legal
history, comparative law, torts and constitutional law (by definition),
contracts, restitution, municipal corporations, criminal law, and just
name it. Not even state and local taxation wholly escape.
Often as not, the complexity and dimensions of the problem first
appear in a conventional torts course in connection with Vincent v.
Lake Erie Transp. Co.,' a case ordinarily dealt with fairly early in the
course. A torts law classic, Vincent held a shipowner liable for mten-
tionally destroying plaintiff's dock, notwithstanding that the shipowner
*Professor of Law, University of Toledo. The author is deeply indebted to the Urn-
versity of Toledo for financial assistance in making this article possible. Thanks also go
to Mr. Tom Sponsler, a senior in the Umversity of Toledo Law School, for his invaluable
research help. Professor Wallace Rudolph of the University of Nebraska Law School must
also be mentioned as he and I worked on many of the ideas hereto presented while teach-
ing together in Lincoln.
1109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W 221 (1910), noted, 10 CoLrer. L. REV. 372 (1910);
23 HAiv. L. Rsv. 490 (1910).
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was not at fault and acted only to save his ship and crew from almost
certain loss m a severe and apparently unexpected storm. If this case is
discussed at any length, one easily touches upon not only such obvious
factual extrapolation problems as the proper result had the ship been
laden with dynamite and/or the shipowner and crew been wholly
impecumous (along with related privilege problems) 2 but also such
superficially disparate matters as the wisdom of a fault system's basic
premises, 3 court-costs and lawyers' fees m criminal cases, 4 zoning,5 jury
service,0 self-defense,7 arrest,8 the "erroneously-but-constitutionally-
convicted-defendant" problem9 and even, on a particularly bad day,
the fairness and/or constitutionality of the Selective Service Act.'0
In necessarily abbreviated form, a not atypical list of student ques-
tions (excluding most of those implied by the examples just men-
tioned) looks something like this:
1) Why, if the shipowner had a privilege to destroy the dock, does
he have to payP Neither the shipowner nor the dockowner was cul-
pable, and the latter did not benefit. He merely escaped inpovensh-
ment. A police officer intentionally destroying a fence in order to catch
a dangerous fleeing felon would not be liable to the fence owner,
would he? Or is that different because his government would have to
payP But that cannot be, because of sovereign mimunity Or is this
case an exception to that doctrine because of the just compensation
clause? 1
2) Would the case against the government m the police-officer-
fence case be different if the police officer acted unreasonably? Then
we would simply have a tort, and surely the just compensation clause
would not apply On the other hand, why shouldn't it?12
3) Is the just compensation clause self-executing? 13
4) Forget constitutional law How do you reconcile Vincent with
the trespass cases m which airplanes non-negligently crashed into farm
2 See text accompanying notes 81-85, 142-159 snfra.
8 See text accompanying note 60 znfra.
4 See text accompanying notes 226-230 tnfra.
5 See text accompanying notes 231-233 tnfra.
6 See text accompanying notes 198-199 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 103-105 snfra.
8 See text accompanying notes 108-112 rnfra.
9 See text accompanying notes 220-229 znfra.
10 See text accompanying notes 200-202 snfra.
11 See text accompanying note 153 tnfra.
12See text accompanying notes 178-183 infra.
'3 See text accompanying notes 165-170 infra
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houses and so forth, and we concluded that the airlines probably
wouldn't be liable?14
5) How is Vincent to be squared with the hypothetical we dis-
cussed in connection with Gilbert v. Stone,'5 the trespass-gelding case,
where the student put a gun at your head and told you he would fire
unless you immediately killed Farmer Jones' cow You argued there
that duress was a defense. Why was not duress, or something like it,
a defense in Vincent? After all, it was a human life against property
in both cases.
6) What I do not understand, apart from historical exceptions like
conversion, 16 is why anyone should ever be liable unless he's culpable.
Of course, taking Blackacre for an interstate road is different because
of the just compensation clause. The Blackacre case, furthermore, does
not involve culpability
7) If the government can't take Blackacre for a road, a park, or a
school without paying for it, why doesn't the government have to pay
me the market value of my time when I'm called upon to chase a felon,
put out a fire, serve as a juror or witness or soldier, or, for that matter,
to fill out my income tax and social security tax forms? 7
8) Under the just compensation clause, is there a difference be-
tween taking a man's services and taking his property? That cannot be,
because I know that the Supreme Court once held that a city could
zone a good business out of existence just because conditions in the
neighborhood changed. No compensation was required in that case.' 8
9) Let's get back to the emergency situation cases. Does Vincent
present the same liability problems as the case in which I dynamite my
neighbor's home in order to save my own and/or my neighbor's, or to
save an entire city, or where I run into Farmer Jones' fence in order
to avoid killing myself and/or myself and a non-negligent child situ-
ated in the middle of the road? 9
10) What about men constitutionally but erroneously convicted?
Are they entitled to just compensation clause recovery?20
34 See text accompanying notes 134-137 znfra.
15 Sty. 72, 82 Eng. Rep. 539 (K.B. 1648). In Gilbert, defendant was forced to
trespass and to take plaintifFs gelding because of third party threats to employ deadly
force against defendant.
16 See generally, Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HArrv. L. REv. 277, 374 (1897),
reprinted in 3 SELcT EssAYs IN AxrLo-AMERcAN LE A. HsToRY 417 (1909); Warren,
Qualifytng as Plaintiff in an Action for Conversion, 49 HAzv. L. REv. 1084 (1936).
17 See text accompanying note 202 infra.
18 See text accompanying notes 230-233 infra.
19 See text accompanying notes 127-128 infra.
20 See text accompanying notes 220-225 znfra.
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11) Suppose an accused is acquitted? Must he pay his lawyer?21
And so on. One can spend months attempting satisfactorily to
answer such questions, and these questions are merely a small illus-
trative sample. Student-teacher frustration is both inevitable and un-
derstandable. There is, after all, the usual pressure "to get along," and
a thing called "negligence" remains to be covered. Yet students in-
sist upon answers, especially from torts teachers, most of whom ap-
pear wedded to the "one-case-a-week, m-some-way-suggest-answers-
to-all-even-half-way-reasonable-questions" method.
To repeat, then, the first reason for the topic chosen is simply a
sanguine attempt to alleviate instructional frustrations.
The second reason is that the problem is made topical by several
developments, not the least of which is the recent decision of Federal
District Judge East in Dillon v. United States.2 Without at this point
going into detail, Judge East's Dillon decision held in a section 2255
context, 23 that the indigent petitioner's court-appomted attorney was
entitled to just compensation recovery for his work in connection with
the hearing. An attorney's learning, experience and time were "prop-
erty," Judge East reasoned, and, because of the peculiar nature of his
property, Dillon's attorney was in effect drafted for society's benefit
and was accordingly entitled to just compensation recovery Dillon,
flying as it did in the face of an almost 24 (though not quite) 2 uiversal
group of Anglo-American decisions to the contrary, was not unex-
pectedly-certainly not for Judge East2 -- reversed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.2 7 Still, the question remains open, as the United
States Supreme Court has just denied certiorari28 and has otherwise
spoken only obliquely on the question.29 Whatever the constitutional
21 See text accompanying note 229 mfra.
22230 F Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 550 (1966), noted, 16 HAsTNos L.J. 274, 26 U. Prrr. L. REv. 150
(1964).
232 8 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
24See the numerous cases cited in United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.
1965).25 See Bomar, Jr., The Compensation of Expert Witnesses, 2 LAw & CoNTEMi.
PRoB. 510 (1935).
28 judge East's opinion makes this crystal dear. He was obviously mad about having
previously been reversed on procedural grounds by the court of appeals.27 United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
2886 Sup. Ct. 550 (1966).
29 The closest the Court has ever come to passing on the question is Coleman v.
United States, 152 U.S. 96 (1893), denying recovery on evidence grounds to various
lawyers who expended momes and time in working upon a case which ultimately proved
financially beneficial to the United States but who did not have an express contract with
the federal government.
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rule ultimately turns out to be, Dillon operated as a catalyst to national
news media and triggered even Time magazine 0 to consider the plight
of the young lawyer appointed to defend an unpopular cause without
pay 31
Along with Judge East's Dillon opinion, of course, there is the
widely publicized Kennedy Bill,3 2 so named for the then Attorney
General and present Junior Senator from New York, which provides
some compensation for lawyers appointed to defend indigent federal
criminal defendants. The American Bar Association, probably on the
theory that something is better than nothing, lobbied strongly for the
bill, but, as can be seen from the President's Page of the November,
1965 American Bar Association Journal,3 3 the association is currently
unhappy with what Congress and the Administration have thus far
wrought. And understandably so. United States Supreme Court prepa-
rations and presentations are not covered, nor are collateral attack
proceedings, such as coram nobis and habeas corpus proceedings
brought on behalf of either state or federal prisoners-to say nothing
of less glaring defects.84 And the pay, even for jury trial work, is a paltry
twenty dollars per day
The analytical relationship between such cases as Vincent, Judge
East's brilliant and ground-breaking opinion m Dillon, and the Crin-
inal Justice Act of 1964, however incongruously associated, is nonethe-
less obvious. The matter is further explored below 3r
Topicality is further illustrated by the recent decision of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Giaccio v. Commonwealth.36 Giaccio held
30 Time, July 10, 1964, p. 46.
31 See generally SAcxs, DE1FnmniNG THE UNroPULAi CLIENT (Nat. Council on Legal
Clinics, 1961).32 Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
3 3 President Kuhn therein states that the Bar is extremely interested m remedying
the Kennedy Bill's inadequacies. Kuhn, 41 A.B.A.J. 991 (1965).
S4 Some of these are mentioned in Judge East's Dillon opinion. See also In re Hagler,
246 F Supp. 716 (D. Hawaii 1965), concerning whether the Criminal Justice Act of
1964 applied to a habeas corpus proceeding where FED. R. Cinm. P. 12 and 48 were
involved. See United States v. Thompson, 34 U.S.L. W=an 2322 (2d Cir. Dec. 6 1965)
(attorney appointed as counsel for indigent criminal defendant before effective date of
Criminal Justice Act not entitled to compensation even though most of his work per-
formed prior to the Act's effective date); Dirring v. United States, 353 F.2d 519 (1st
Cir. 1965) (indigent defendant who had counsel through appeal not entitled to ap-
pointed counsel to prosecute post-appeal motion for new trial). Compare United States
v. Boyden, 248 F Supp. 291 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (attorney assigned to represent indigent
defendant in probation revocation proceeding is entitled to compensation under Criminal
Justice Act).
85 See text accompanying note 226 infra.
36 02 Pa. Super. 294, 196 A.2d 189 (1963), afd, 415 Pa. 139, 202 A.2d 55 (1964).
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constitutional a Pennsylvania statute providing that a person acquitted
of a misdemeanor can be compelled to pay both his and the govern-
ment's court costs if the acquitting jury In its discretion sees fit so
to assess them. Not surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction last term, and reversal came in January,
1966.11 While the Court's decision was based on relatively narrow
vagueness grounds,38 the basic issue was really one of Just compensa-
tion twice over. For Pennsylvama not only demed (albeit unpliedly)
the acquitted Giaccio the right to recover for loss of reputation and
humiliation and for out-of-pocket expenses such as loss of wages and
lawyers' fees, but also forced hm to pick up the court costs for Penn-
sylvania's own mistake, however excusable 9.3  The United States
Supreme Court would have done the same had it affirmed. The
Giacczo problem, in other words, is fundamentally only a dramatic
sequel to the traditional plight of the "constitutionally-but-erroneously-
convicted defendant" 40 and, as such, its relationship to the broad prob-
See generally, Cooley, Public Law, 1963-1964 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, Part One, 26
U. Prrr. L. REv. 171, 176ff., Note, 26 U. Prrr. L. REv. 632 (1965).
Perhaps further light on the basic problem raised by Giaccto will be afforded by the
court's decision Rinaldi v. Yeager, 238 F Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1965), Rinaldi holds
that an indigent New Jersey state prisoner's federal constitutional rights were not vio-
lated by state's application, pursuant to statute, of his institutional wages to payment of
cost of transcript furnished him for use on an unsuccessful appeal from his conviction.
37 The Court reversed by a vote of 9 to 0. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 86 Sup. Ct. 518
(1966). Mr. Justice Black went solely upon the ground that the Pennsylvania Act was
constitutionally invalid (because too vague) both as written and as explained by the
Pennsylvania courts. Mr. Justice Black expressly refrained from passing upon any equal
protection question or upon the constitutional propriety of assessing costs against acquitted
defendants. The Court also went out of its way to state that its judgment was not in-
tended "to cast doubt on the constitutionality of the settled practice of many
states to leave to juries finding defendants guilty of a crime the power to fix punishment
within legally prescribed limits." Id. at 522 n.8.
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Fortas briefly concurred in separate opimons.
Both Justices obviously felt that the Court's disclaimer as regards passing upon the con-
stitutionality of submitting the punishment issue to juries was not enough to overcome
certain indirect radiations from its opinion. These Justices concurred in reversal on the
sole ground that assessing costs against acquitted defendants under any circumstances
violates due process. Ibid.
As I have elsewhere observed, the rationale of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
rehearing denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1963), seems to me almost inescapably to require the
federal constitutional invalidation of the practice of submitting punishment questions to
juries. See Broeder and Merson, Robinson v. California: An Abbreviated Study, 3 Az.
Cam. L.Q. 203 (1965).
8s Appellant understandably argued the case largely in terms of vagueness and equal
protection. Brief for Appellant, p. 4, Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, supra note 37.
89 See text accompanying note 222 infra. Giacc:o should be compared with Com-
monwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952).
40 See text accompanying note 222 infra.
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lem herein considered is apparent. Vincent and Dillon are not legal
light years apart from cases such as Giaccto, though Giacczo, to be
sure, involves a government mistake.
Of course, the "innocent victim of a government mistake prob-
lem" is hardly new Turn to any history book, or examine a mumcipal
government treatise or even today's newspaper. Yet over the years
the dimensions of the problem have markedly increased. Government,
at least in the United States, has progressively grown larger and, al-
most by definition, so has the number of its mistakes. The innocent
victim's ability to obtain political redress of any particular govern-
ment mistake, in contrast, has commensurately diminished, notwith-
standing the vastly increased seriousness of modern-day governmental
ineptitude.
So, too, modern government means "sophisticated" government,
and tius in turn means still more innocent victims of government us-
takes. A recent case in point is Fleshour v. United States,41 which, for
want of negligence, denied recovery under the Federal Tort Claims
Act to a federal prisoner viciously assaulted by a fellow inmate who
was being "rehabilitated" by prison officials by associating him with
"good prison risks" such as plaintiff. What is this but a modern version
of the ancient "constitutionally-but-erroneously-convicted-defendant"
problem? Historic legalistic distinctions abound, of course, but the
district court's remarks in denying relief are applicable to both situa-
tions and to others later to be discussed:
The court reaches this conclusion with some reluctance since it
seems unfortunate that plaintiff who here may be euphemistically
characterized as an "innocent bystander" should not be compensated
for his injuries. Risk of serious physical damages or even death
should not be an inherent and uncompensated element of every prison
sentence. If the experts are correct that sound penology requires
the taking of such calculated risks, some provision should be made
to compensate a prisoner who, through no fault of his own and in the
absence of negligence by prison officials, nevertheless is seriously
injured.
This is not to suggest that the Government should become the
insurer of the physical well being of every prisoner. But where, as
here, a prisoner is attacked in his sleep with no provocation or other
action on his part and the attacker has the opportunity to strike be-
cause it is desirable as a matter of broad penal policy to give it to
him, the innocent and fortuitous victim, if not compensated, pays a
far greater penalty than the sentence imposed upon hun and that
41244 F Supp. 762 (N.D. III. 1965).
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paid by others given the same term but luckily not injured during
incarceration.
Our society has recognized that the taking of calculated risks is
sometimes desirable or even necessary . . By and large, we have
sought to compensate persons injured as a result of taking such risks
even though the law generally precludes compensation for damages
resulting from risks taken by the person injured. The Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, other federal laws as well as most state Work-
men's Compensation Laws, exclude assumption of risk as a defense
to a claim. The reasons are obvious and sound. We ask people to take
risks in the interest of the entire community. If, as a result, they are
injured, they should be compensated.
Similarly, we ask prisoners to take risks in the process of attempt-
mg to rehabilitate as many as possible, a result greatly in the com-
munity interest. If, as a consequence, one is injured through no fault
of his own it seems unfortunate and unfair that he be made to ac-
cept his injuries as additional punishment. To date at least the law
gives a prisoner so injured no right to compensation. In the opinion
[of this] judge, at least, it should.42
The point, in other words, is that government legally ought to
pay for at least some of its non-negligent mistakes and that m many
situations we are still forced to work with an outmoded body of tort
and Just compensation law. The reader might profitably ask himself
at this point whether the result might possibly have been different
m the "rehabilitative-prison" case had plaintiff Fleishour sued di-
rectly on just compensation grounds under the Tucker Act.43 Cer-
tainly Fleishour's body was taken for the public benefit.
But there is another side. As our industrial and material wealth
has increased, so has our collective psychological and social concern
for society's injured victims. Certainly the above-quoted remarks re-
flect such concern, as do our vast state and federal social welfare pro-
grams. And, it should be noted, as least one state, California,44 fol-
lowing England's lead 45 (why must we generally follow England on
the legal domestic side even with our fifty states and thousands of
local government units?) has recently enacted legislation designed
partially to compensate innocent victims of crime. California acted m
part, of course, because of commiseration with these people, but
42 Id. at 767-768.
43 Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified m scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
4 4 CAL. WELFARiE & INST'NS CODE § 1121 (1965). See Foulkes, Compensating
Victims of Violence, 52 A.B.A.J. 237 (1966).
45 Scottish Home & Health Dept., Report of Secretary of State and Secretary of State
of Scotland, C¢mm. No. 2323 (1963-64). It is axiomatic that we domestically lag behind
England in almost every social welfare endeavor.
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more probably on account of a realization that those directly respon-
sible for the plight of such victims were already or hopefully soon
would be in jail and that tort recovery against jailed and ordinarily
impecunious crminnals is, for the most part, a practical impossibility 46
Our collective guilt complex vis-a-vis both the non-negligently
and negligently injured is also mirrored in recent judicial develop-
ments expanding the area of tort recovery Such developments are
by no means picayune and accordingly furnish still another reason
for writing. Traditional charitable corporation and intra-familial im-
munity doctrines have in many states been abandoned or eroded.47
The scope of immunity of municipal corporations has almost every-
where been narrowed and, in a few states, abolished.48 Indeed, the
courts of several states have boldly abolished the tort immunity of all
levels of government.49 Congress, of course, earlier moved in the
same general direction with the Federal Torts Claims Act. 0 Sovereign
immunity in one form or another, it need hardly be said, has been
one of the historical legal bugaboos in terms of which many other-
wise meritorious just compensation and tort claims have gone to
grief.51
Increased judicial concern for the plight of injured plaintiffs by
46 Mr. Justice Goldberg is one of the few ever directly to address himself to the
question:
Whenever the government considers extending a needed service to those
accused of crime, the question arises: But what about the victim. We should
confront the problem of the victim directly; his burden is not alleviated by
denying necessary services to the accused.95 Many countries throughout the
world, recognizing that crne is a community problem, have designed systems
for government compensation of victims of crime. Serious consideration of this
approach is long overdue here. The victim of a robbery or an assault has been
denied the "protection" of the laws in a very real sense, and society should
assume some responsibility for making him whole.
In note 95, the Justice said, "One effect of requiring the accused to employ his available
funds to pay the costs of his defense may be to exhaust or limit the funds from which
the victim may recover in a civil suit for damages against the accused. This is among the
problems worthy of consideration." Goldberg, Equality and Government, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 205, 224-225 (1964).
47 Consult SEAVEY, KEETON & KEETON, CASES ON TORTS 261ff. (2d ed. 1964).48 See Mitau, What Has Happened to the Study of State Public Law by Political
Sctentists?. A Note on Achievements and Lacunae in the Study of State Constitutional
Law Since 1950, 14 J. PuB. L. 90 (1965).
49 Ibid.
5o 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The leading
interpretative cases are Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), and Indian Tow-
mg Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). The classic study of the Federal Torts
Claims Act is Gottlieb, The Federal Torts Claims Act: A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo.
L.J. 1 (1946).
51 See Mitau, op. cit. supra note 48.
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no means ends with the erosion of various tort imnunity doctrines.
The "privity concept" in products liability cases, for example, is now
largely dead, and several states have adopted strict (i.e., "warranty"
and "products-misrepresentation") liability in most of such cases,
with the economic loss situations constituting the only major remain-
ing exception.52 Warranty theory is likewise slowly replacing negli-
gence as the liability touchstone in commercial bailment cases.5"
Similarly, and more importantly for present purposes, the traditional
"no duty to act" principle has to a large degree been emasculated.
The most dramatic illustration is probably Judge Hofstader's opinion
in Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants Corp.,54 holding a cooperative apartment
liable on both common law tort and statutory grounds for refusing
to rent to a Jew on account of his religion. Many other illustrations
could readily be put, among them the novel and widely discussed
decision in Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove.5 5 Twisting the
traditional concept of duty to act completely out of shape, Wilmington
apparently holds a hospital liable for failing to render emergency
room assistance to a child on the sole ground that the hospital pos-
sessed such a room. O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital,56 involving an
adult heart attack victim, is similar.
Indeed, learned and penetrating academic attacks on the entire
"no duty to act" principle, particularly as regards emergency situa-
tions, have recently been mounted. The excellent and incisive studies
of Professors Rudolph 7 and Dawson 8 are illustrative, as are the
numerous and well-considered papers delivered at the recent "Good
Samaritan" Conference of the Uiversity of Chicago Law School.59
52 See generally Gossett, The Law: Leader or Laggard in Our Society, 51 A.B.A.J.
1131, 1134 (1965). The most recent case, which cites and discusses the authorities on
both sides, is Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 34 U.S.L. W= 2402 (Tenn. Jan. 5, 1966).
53 Ibid.
5441 Misc. 2d 512, 245 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd on other grounds and
dismissal granted, 21 App. Div. 2d 662, 249 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 718,
.05 N.E.2d 196, 256 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1964).
56 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961).
56 11 App. Div. 2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
57 Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. Rev. 499 (1965).
58 Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 1A1v. L. REv. 817,
1073, 1104-05 (1961). See also id. at 1105 nn.75-76. See also Comment, The Failure to
Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 CoLum. L. 1Egv. 631 (1952).
59 The various papers in question were graciously made available to me by Dean
Ratcliffe. Doubtless they have in many respects been subconsciously drawn upon here.
The authors' names and their respective papers follow- Barth, The Vanishing Samaritan;
Fingarette, Good Samaritan; Freedman, No Response to the Cry for Help and General
Remarks, An International Experiment on the Effects of a Good Samaritan Law; Gold-
stem, Citizen Cooperation: The Perspective of the Police; Gregory, The Good Samaritan
[Vol. 17
Such papers, edited by Dean Ratcliffe, are scheduled for almost in-
mediate publication and deal with all facets of the "duty to act"
problem, legal, moral, and psychological. Triggered m large part
by the nationwide guilt complex engendered by the failure of 'a large
number of persons to lift so much as a telephone m order to prevent
the murder of Kitty Genovese, the Umversity of Chicago Conference
is probably only the first of its type.
The fact of the matter, of course, is that both the courts and the
legal academic community have become progressively disenchanted
with the fault system's individualistic premise that only the culpable
should pay and then but sometimes.60 For good or ill, risk-distribution
theory has come to sit ever more firmly in the saddle. Aside from
the above-noted developments, the revised Restatement of Torts re-
flects this shift of emphasis in a host of ways, among them fundamen-
tal, plaintiff-oriented changes in such widely disparate areas as oc-
cupier-responsibility, 6' products liability 2 and duty to act.6 3 Of course,
the trend, even in the Restatement, is by no means uniform. Risk-
distribution theory, for example, is hardly compatible with the posi-
tion taken by the Council mn Tentative Draft Number Eleven to the
effect that airlines should not normally be liable for ground damage
occasioned by their falling non-negligently operated and maintained
aircraft.64 But, as discussed below,65 there is an ambiguous legal
ringer even here.
One final point. Aside from instructional frustrations and topical-
ity, the subject chosen here is hopefully appropriate for still another
reason. As professor Dunham recently pointed out,66 the Court has
thus far done little to give even generalized guidance concerning the
and the Bad; Gusfield, Social Sources of Levites and Samaritans: Honor, Law, Morals
and Rescue; Moms, General Remarks: Tunc, The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan;
and Waller, The Good Samaritan and the Bad. The most recent article is Foster, Good
Samaritanism, 52 A.B.A.J. 223 (1966).
60 Authority is unnecessary.
61 REsTATEmmNT (SEcoND), TORTS §§ 340-341 (1965).
6 2 REsTATEM:NT (SEcoNd), TOnTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
6 3 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS §§ 314-324A (1965).
64 RrinET ETr (SEcoND), TORTS § 520A (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
65 See text accompanying notes 134-137 znfra.
66 Dunham, Grzggs v. Allegheny County in Prospective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. RE-v. 63, 71-81. Likewise consult the following:
Abend, Federal Liability for Takings and Torts: An Anomalous Relationship, 31
ForDHAm L. REv. 481 (1963); Kratovil and Harrson, Eminent Domain-Policy and
Concept, 42 CA.=. L. REV. 596 (1954); McDougal & Mueller, Public Purpose in Public
Housing: An Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE L.J. 42 (1942); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); and Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent
Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
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meaning of the fifth amendments just compensation clause, and there
is virtually nothing from the Court on the relationship of that clause
to sovereign mimunity or to tort law One cannot even say whether
the clause is self-executing, let alone what constitutes "property" or
a "taking."67 Indeed, as everyone dealing with the problem (including
the Court) 68 concedes, the area is principally characterized by its
highly ambiguous and irreconcilable decisions.69 Probably no other
clause of the Bill of Rights has been so sorrowfully neglected by the
Court, notwithstanding that it was the first to be applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.70
So much, then, and it was probably far too much, by way of intro-
duction. A brief word now concerning organization. Conventional
tort law problems beginning with cases such as Vincent are dealt with
first. Just compensation problems are next considered, followed by
the usual "law-review-form reflections and conclusions." There is, to
be sure, considerable overlapping in the first two sections and to
demonstrate its extent is one of the article's principal purposes.
Torts
The broad message here, as in the Just Compensation section
which follows, is that the traditional legal distinctions are for the
most part indefensible so far as many of the cases posed in the In-
troduction are concerned and that the losses in such cases, and m
many related ones, should, so far as possible, fall upon the better risk-
bearer who, in most situations, will be the acting party
Vincent, canonized by the Restatement,71 is, as previously im-
plied, the logical starting place. Most of the pertinent facts have
previously been related although the point that neither the ship-
owner nor the dockowner was culpable was, for present purposes
perhaps, not sufficiently stressed. The shipowner, to be sure, destroyed
the dock in order to save his ship and the lives of himself and his
crew, but he was also, in Restatement parlance, "incompletely pnvi-
leged" to do so.73 In other words, as cases such as the classic Ploof v.
67 See, e.g., Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage District, 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 958 (1956).68 See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
69 See Sax, supra note 66, at 45.
70 Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
7 1 RE.STATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 197, illustration 2 (1965).
72 See text accompanying note 1 supra.
73 See, e.g., RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 263, comment on Subsection (2), at
497 (1965).
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Putnam74 make clear, the dockowner m Vincent would certainly have
been liable had he sought to prevent his dock's destruction at the
shipowner's expense. 5 Still, as there is little, if anything, to choose
between the Vincent shipowner and the dockowner on a risk-bearer
basis, it seems only fair that the former should pay What, if any,
liability to either the shipowner (on a contribution or indemnity
theory) or the dockowner should exist on the part of the crew mem-
bers and/or third parties whose cargo was saved by the shipowner's
action is, to say the least, unclear. Such matters have been adequately
dealt with elsewhere.7 6 They are mentioned here merely to show the
complexity of the issues involved.
Oddly enough, however, Vincent rests not on the suggested ground
but on the obviously indefensible ground that the shipowner, after
the storm arose, strengthened the cables which held his ship to the
dock. As the Vincent dissent cogently observes, 77 the majority result
would presumably have been different had the original cables been
as strong as the later ones and/or had the ship never been tied to the
dock in the first place. Even the majority concede that there would
have been no liability had the ship initially been uncabled and the
dock destroyed by reason of the storm's blowing of the ship against
it. Such distinctions are difficult to explain.
Yet, according to at least two Restatements,78 Vincent supposedly
stands for the proposition that one is liable for intentionally destroy-
ing another's life, limb or property in order to save either his own
and/or a third party's. A few decisions superficially appear to support
this,7" but even these for the most part can be otherwise explained,
and, as a basic proposition, the assertion falls flat.80 Indeed, at least
one case,"' albeit in a pleading context, rejects Vincent altogether.
Even the Restatement of Torts, with an inconsistency born either of
expediency or oversight, apparently finds Vincent inapplicable in cer-
tam false imprisonment contexts. Thus, while retail merchants are
7481 Vt. 471, 71 AUt. 188 (1908).
7 5 RESTATEm:ENT (SEcoND), ToRTs § 77, illustrations 4 & 5 (1965).
70 See generally Dawson, Negotiorum Gesto: The Altrutstic Intermeddler, 74 HAv.
L. REv. 817, 1073; 1104-05 (1961); Rudolph, The Duty to Act A Proposed Rule, 44
Nu. L. REv. 499 (1965).
77 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W 221 (1910).
78 See RESATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 197, illustration 2 (1965); REsTATEMENT,
REsTrrurmoN § 122 (1937).
70 See generally PaossEn, TO RTs, 125, 129 n.6 (3d ed. 1964) and authorities therein
cited.
80 Hopefully, the text discussion which follows sufficiently illustrates this.
sl Umon Assur. Co. v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 515, 31 P.2d 793 (1934).
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privileged to detain customers reasonably though mistakenly sus-
pected of shoplifting,82 the merchants so acting presumably do not
have to pay for the value of their customers' time while so detained,
nor need they compensate for loss of reputation or embarrassment
or attendant economic and/or property losses resulting from such
privileged detentions. Why the Restaters think the freedom of loco-
motion in this context is less deserving of compensation than the
dock involved in Vincent is nowhere explained.
The cases, such as they are, are unclear, and only God knows what
the law is for situations such as Turner v. Mellon,83 where a divided
Califorma Supreme Court denied recovery against a telephone com-
pany whose employee took the initiative in reasonably though mis-
takenly identifying plaintiff to the police as the man who had robbed
the company's office on three separate recent occasions. Because of
the high value society places on the interests of privacy and freedom
of locomotion, probable cause has, even in temporary detention situa-
tions, traditionally not been a defense to false impnsonment actions.84
Yet Turner goes the other way, and the entire Turner problem is con-
fused by the "private citizen arrest cases" which have almost always
been thought to invest private citizens with legal authority to arrest
without warrant anyone reasonably though mistakenly thought to
have committed a felony provided only that the felony for which the
arrest is made has in fact been committed. 8 Interestingly, however,
Turner fails even to discuss the law of private citizen arrest, and
neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions mention any sort of
a Vincent problem. Nor, in these respects, is Turner atypical.
In light of the position here generally assumed, of course, Turner
seems wrong, for defendant was obviously the better nsk-bearer, and
the individual's interest in privacy and freedom of locomotion is more
important on Turner facts than society's interest in crime prevention
and detection. The Restatement of Torts position in the "reasonably
though mistakenly suspected shoplifter cases" should be rejected for
similar reasons.88
The late Professor Morris, while rejecting the reasoning of the
8 2 RESTATEUMNT (SECOND), TORTS § 120A (1965).
8341 Cal. 2d 45, 257 P.2d 15 (1953).
8 4 See PRossR, TORTS 61 (3d ed. 1964) and authorities therein cited.
85See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 119 (1965); Moreland, The
Use of Force m Effecting or Remsting Arrest, 33 NEB. L. REv. 408 (1954); Warner, The
Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942).
86 The Restatement position, of course, justifies "reasonable detentions." REsTATE-
mENT (SECOND), TORTS § 120A (1965).
[Vol. 17
Vincent majority opinion, once sought to justify its result on the
ground of the necessity of securing the dockowner's cooperation in
saving the ship, crew and cargo. That is, the dockowner, unless legally
assured of recovery for his dock, would be strongly tempted to save
it at the expense of the ship and crew 87 I have yet to find the student
who would buy the analysis, and I seriously doubt whether Professor
Morris ever did either. Aside from the point that the explanation re-
flects an unduly bleak view of human nature and contemporary
moral standards, there is the further point, previously made,8 8 that
cases such as Ploof89 render any "dock-savmg-at-the-expense-of-ships-
and-crews" activities by dockowners tortious. If Ploof and related
cases are not sufficient to preclude dockowner interference, certainly
the fact that Vincent can somewhere be found in the reports can
hardly be expected to do so.
Furthermore, the Morris argument untenably assumes that the
dockowner either is law-trained or has a lawyer handy for all unex-
pected "dock-endangered-by-ship-type" storms and suggests, perhaps
unintentionally, that dockowner interference would be non-tortious
provided that the dockowner knows (and/or had probable or rea-
sonable cause to know?) that the shipowner (and/or the crew?) was
uninsured and otherwise impecunious.
Finally, the dockowner is here not being asked to do anything.
Rather he need only refrain from acting in order not to endanger
the lives and valuable property of third parties. Parenthetically, it
should be noted that the Morris analysis logically compels the re-
pudiation of the "no duty to act" principle for emergency situations.
For if tort law is not to impose liability upon one who fails to tele-
phone the police in order to prevent the murder of Mrs. Genovese
nor to compensate (on either tort or quasi-contract grounds) the
citizen who does, it can hardly compensate a dockowner for sitting
on his hands and merely refraining from destroying or substantially
endangering other people's lives and property in order to save his
own. Perhaps, as many have argued,10 the "no duty to act cases" are
indefensible, but to repudiate them simply in order to explain Vincent
is a bit too much.
8 7 Momus, ToRTS 42-46 (1953).
88 See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
89 Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 Ad. 188 (1908).
90 See Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARv. L. REv.
817, 1073, 1104-05 (1961); Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L.
R -v. 499 (1965). See also Comment, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 631 (1952).
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Morris' reasoning is still of interest, however, for he employs it
to explain a large body of otherwise irreconcilable cases which the
Restaters and other authoritative spokesmen (Seavey, for example) 9
have ordinarily seen fit to ignore when discussing and expanding upon
Vincent. Morris employs Cordas v. Peerless Transp.92 as illustrative
of the cases m question and the same is done here. In Cordas, as
Morris states it,
a pursued armed bandit jumped into a taxicab and ordered the
driver to get going. The driver put the cab in low gear, accelerated
as fast as he could, suddenly slammed on his brakes to throw the
bandit off balance, and leaped from the cab. The cab motor kept
running, and the moving vehicle veered onto the sidewalk and in-jured the pedestrian plaintiff. The court held the driver not liable
in spite of the great likelihood that his intentional act, done in a
congested downtown locale, would cause injury and was done to
save his own hide.93
While noting several minor differences between Vincent and cases
such as Cordas, Morris bagically reconciles them by observing that in
Cordas "the pedestrian could do nothing to impede the cab driver
from executing his plan of escape. No promise of compensation is
needed to affect the pedestrian's behavior- he [sic] need not be
given compensation to encourage cooperation [whereas the dock-
owner in Vincent does]."94 The distinction appears insupportable not
only for the reasons above-stated but also because the cab company
is patently the superior risk-bearer and because its driver, at least on
Morrs' assumption, non-negligently assumed the role on behalf of
himself and the company of a private executioner with a ninety per-
cent probability of success. One can only speculate on what Morris
would have said had evidence in the cab case shown that the driver
acted exclusively or primarily to capture the bandit for society's
benefit, rather than to protect himself and/or the company, and had
himself been injured. Should the driver's affirmative cooperation for
society's benefit (on an a fortiori Vincent analogy) then be paid for
by society on some novel just compensation basis, or should we simply
forget about "cooperation payment" because of the absence of a sol-
vent private-citizen defendant?
91 There is really no page citation that can be indicated here. That the eases in
question have been overlooked, however, is apparent from the juxtaposition of the cases
and other materials in all editions of the Seavey, Keeton & Keeton torts casebooks.
9227 N.Y.S.2d 198 (City Ct. of N.Y. 1941).
9 3 MoM, op. cit. supra note 87, at 45.
94 Ibzd.
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Unfortunately, Cordas is no legal freak. Wrong as it may be, judicial
backing for it is considerable. Cases such as Noll v. Marian,95 while a
step further removed from cases like Cordas in terms of relative in-
defensibility, should also be noted. The Noll problem, m sum, is
somewhat like this. A bandit, brandishing an apparently loaded re-
volver and attempting to rob defendant's bank, informs the teller
that he will take deadly action against both the teller and the bank
customers present if the teller fails to hand over certain cash im-
mediately or attempts to impede the robbery's success in any way
The teller nevertheless sounds an alarm, and the bandit murders a cus-
tomer. The conventional and Restatement of Torts approach to this
and related problems is that the bank is not liable for the death
provided the teller acted "reasonably" under all of the circumstances
(whatever this may mean in such a context) and that an important
factor in determining "reasonableness" is the bank-teller's interest
in saving his employer's cash. How this materially differs from Vincent
I fail to understand, particularly as the bank not only is the better risk-
bearer vis-a-vis its customer but also has a duty of care with respect
to the customer that is lacking in cases such as Cordas.
This last point, however, is by no means intended to suggest that
the result in a Noll situation should depend upon the status of the
injured or deceased party on the land. Indeed, for my part (though
no case even remotely supports the suggestion), it is arguable that
the bank should be liable to the bandit's lookout-confederate should
the confederate fortuitously happen to be killed or injured by the
bandit on account of the teller's action. Assumption of risk is in
judicial disfavors and would not, save for ambiguous visceral reac-
tions and a large body of ill-considered felony murder cases,9' con-
ventionally cover a look-out concealed from view and killed by the
bandit's fortuitously-miscarrymg bullet.9 8 The case of a pedestrian hit
while walking on the sidewalk adjacent to the bank is a fortiori.
One final point. It should be noted that, while Noll went for de-
fendant on "no negligence as a matter of law" grounds, the modem
91347 Pa. 213, 32 A.2d 18 (1943), noted, 18 TEhi,. L.Q. 290 (1944).
96 Authority is not needed for this proposition.
97 See generally HALL, GmimuL PEINcPLEs OF CumrujL LAw, ch. 4 (2d ed. 1960);
MommAND, A RATioNAT oF CnmmALNEGLIGENCE (1944); Mueller, Where Murder
Begms, 2 N.H.B.J. 214 (1960); and Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41
Hnv. L. REv. 1 (1927).
98 It is basic to assumption of risk theory that the plaintiff consciously assents to the
risk, and the lookout, provided he is sufficiently well-hidden, certainly does not consent
to being shot or even, in many situations, to the risk thereof.
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judicial trend on similar facts is otherwise-at least to the extent of
permitting the case of an injured or deceased plaintiff-customer to get
to the jury 99
Noll, °00 Cordas'01 and Vincent,102 are all self-defense cases in one
sense, although Vincent differs from Noll and Cordas in that the self-
defensive action taken in Vincent was 100 per cent, rather than just 90
per cent or 80 per cent, certain to result in serious harm to innocent
parties. Noll also differs from the other two cases in that the teller m
Noll acted primarily to protect the bank's cash rather than his own
person or property
However, none of these cases involves what would academically
be regarded as a conventional self-defense problem. The usual such
case goes off either on "dwelling house" grounds or on some version
of the so-called "retreat doctrine,"103 and, in my experience, the vital
point of whether or not an acting party is liable for employing deadly
force against one reasonably but mistakenly suspected of endanger-
mg the actor's life without legal cause is often missed. 04 Of course,
there is no liability in situations where the actor is both reasonable
and correct in his thinking.10 5 The Restatement of Torts, however,
draws no distinction between the two groups of cases, positing no
liability in both.106 Fortunately, most cases do not support such an
"all or nothing at all" approach, and certainly traditional tort law
99 See, e.g., Genovay v. Fox, 50 N.J. Super. 538, 143 A.2d 229 (1958), rev'd on its
particular facts, 29 N.J. 436, 149 A.2d 212 (1959). Here, the New Jersey Superior Court
held a bowling-alley-bar proprietor liable when plaintiff patron was shot and wounded by
a gunman who was jumped by another patron while the bowling alley was being robbed.
The court expressly stated, and tlus was the agreed assumption on appeal to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, that the proprietor was under a duty to conduct himself so as to
avoid inducing or encouraging resistance to the bandit if resistance reasonably appeared
to entail a substantially increased risk of serious injury or death to those present. See also
Liberty Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696 (1957).
100 Noll v. Marian, 347 Pa. 213, 32 A.2d 18 (1943).
101 Cordas v. Peerless Transportation, 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (City Ct. of N.Y. 1941).
102 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W 221 (1910).
i03 See generally HALL & MuELLER, Camm . LAw AND PnocEnDm: CAsss AND
PtLEuiNcs, 663ff. (2d ed. 1965) and authorities therein cited.
104 The problem of "excessive threats" in relation to action which would be legal in
the various situations discussed in the text, and others, is not here considered. Obviously,
there are many cases in which one would, both criminally and civilly, be legally justified
in threatening excessive force provided that lesser force or no force was really intended.
See, e.g., People v. Doud, 223 Mich. 120, 193 N.W 884 (1923). RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TORTS (1965) is ambiguous. Section 131 equates the threat of unreasonable
force with its actual use; but of. §§ 46, 70.
105 Of course, one could go on ad infinitum. Obviously all of the possibilities cannot
here be exposed. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS §§ 70, 131 (1965).
106 See RESTATFmNT (SEcoND), TORTS §§ 65-75 (1965).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [vol. 17
has been that one acting in self-defense does so at his peril, z.e., the
actor is liable if the facts turn out to be different from what he rea-
sonably supposed them to be.10 7 This, furthermore, is the lesson to
be drawn from traditional arrest cases n which a private citizen or
even a police officer employs deadly force while reasonably but mis-
takenly supposing the existence of facts which, if true, would legally
afford him the right to employ such force in order to effectuate an
arrest10
Even less defensible, though involving the use of deadly force
in order to prevent crime rather than to arrest, is the Restatement
of Torts view concerning the liability of one using a gun m order to
save the life or limb of one whom the actor reasonably though mis-
takenly believes is about to suffer such harm at the hands of a third
party The Restatement, of course, finds no liability 109 A more difficult
case from the Restatement standpoint (which, oddly enough, is easier
in terms of the position here taken) would be one in which both the
actor and the person on whose behalf deadly force was employed
reasonably but mistakenly thought that its use was necessary
The actor should be liable in all three situations. While there is
nothing to choose between the actor and victim in any of such cases,
these cases in terms of culpability and there will sometimes be nothing
to distinguish them on a risk-distribution basis, the defendant in most
such cases will still, because of both the respondeat superior doctrine
and the notion of "which party will more likely be insured," ordi-
narily be the better risk-bearer.
Furthermore, all of these cases involve an extremely serious and
difficult plaintiff-proof problem. The fortuitously-miscarrymg-bullet
problem (in which A fires at B and accidentally kills C) can for
present purposes be ignored. Probably no court would today dis-
tinguish between one who lawfully and intentionally ains at and
hits his intended victim and one whose bullet under the above cir-
cumstances accidentally kills a person at whom his gun was not in-
tentionally aimed. The exceptions would involve congested-area-neg-
ligence situations and certain indefensible criminal cases."0 Not even
the Restatement of Torts allows anyone to become a private-execu-
tioner 100 per cent likely to succeed, and the problem of determining
107 See Chapman v. Hargrove, 204 S.W 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). See also
Crabtree v. Dawson, 119 Ky. 148, 83 S.W 557 (1904); Fixico v. State, 39 Okla. Crnm. 95,
263 Pac. 171 (1928), noted, 13 ConN. L.Q. 623 (1928).
108 1bid.
109 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 76 (1965).
110See generally MoRELAND, MODERN CRmuNA PaocEnuuE 28-48 (1958).
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whether or not the actor employed deadly force lawfully to arrest
his victim, and/or to protect his dwelling house from forcible and
unlawful entry, or to prevent serious crime, or to protect someone's
life or limb, rather than out of revenge or for other legally impermis-
sible reasons is, under the Restatement view, left to the vagaries of
the jury system. Enough has been written about these to justify ignor-
ing them here.""' The mixed-motive and/or intent problem is further
discussed below 112 Case law and Restatement of Torts subtleties as
to whether the force in question is "deadly" and/or "reasonably em-
ployed" under differing facts are beyond this article's scope.
The Laidlow v. Sage"" problem furnishes still an additional reason
for allowing recovery in the above-mentioned situations. The case
is deservedly a classic in its own right but has become famous for
all time, even to laymen, because of its treatment by Stryker in his
justly renowned Art of Advocacy." 4
Russell Sage, it seems, whatever his "will-death-bed" change of
heart, was a miserly, distrustful man during his lifetime, and, in con-
sonance with the "robber baron" ethics of his day, accumulated a
vast fortune. Sage's human frailties, more than his beneficient Foun-
dation, ensure him an everlasting place in history Sage's torts law
combatant, the almost equally famous Laidlow, was in contrast a
gentleman whose ultimate physical fate was, according to him, de-
termined by Sage's action on the afternoon of December 4, 1891.
Sage was nationally known as a man who hated banks and kept an
abnormally large amount of cash in his Boston office, a miserable
hovel. Laidlow had the misfortune of being present when Sage was
called from his inner office by one Norcross, small bag in hand, and
was presented with a note by Norcross demanding 1,200,000 dollars.
The note read as follows: "The bag I hold in my hand contains ten
pounds of dynamite. If I drop this bag on the floor, the dynamite
will explode, and destroy this building in runs, and kill every human
being in the building. I demand $1,200,000 or I will drop the bag.
Will you give it? Yes or no?"il 5
M11 See, e.g., the various studies and authorities cited in Broeder, Plaintiff's Family
Status As Affecting Juror Behavior: Some Tentative Insights, 14 J. PUB. L. 131 (1965).
112 See text accompanying note 124 infra.
11373 Hun 125, 25 N.Y. Supp. 955 (Sup. Ct. 1893), rev'd, 80 Hun 550, 30 N.Y.
Supp. 496 (1894), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 374, 37 N.Y. Supp. 770 (1896), rev'd, 158 N.Y.
73, 52 N.E. 679 (1899).
114 SvYxmm, THE ART or ADvocAcY (1954).
315 Laidlow v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73, 78, 52 N.E. 679, 680 (1899).
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As stated by the New York Court of Appeals, Sage
read the letter twice, folded it, handed it back to Norcross, and
then commenced parleying with him, stating that he had an engage-
ment with two gentlemen, that he was short of time, and, if it was
going to take much time, he wanted hun to come later m the day
Norcross, after a second, said "Then, do I understand you to refuse
my offer?" Norcross held the bag at the end of his fingers, walked
backward towards the door through which he came, and, when he
reached the threshold, he stopped, and looked at the defendant.
The defendant stepped back a little towards the desk that was m
the anteroom, while Norcross was going the other way As he
reached the threshold, he looked at the defendant, and said, "I
would rather infer from your answers that you refuse my offer"
Norcross then gave one look, stepped to one side, when the flash
came, and it was all over in two seconds.iio
Customer Laidlow was at this point a vegetable. Sage, who
emerged virtually unscathed, had, according to Laidlow, deliberately
employed him as a human shield in order to protect Sage from the
effects of the almost certainly forthcoming blast.
Sage's defense was that his action was "instinctive" rather than
"voluntary," and such defense, while unfortunately never passed
upon by the New York Court of Appeals, was sanctioned at least
twice by the Appellate Division, although somewhat ambiguously the
second time:
[D]efendant's counsel. requested the court to charge that "if
the jury find from the evidence that the defendant did take the
plaintiff and use him as a shield, but that this action was mvolun-
tary, or such as would instinctively result from a sudden and irre-
sistible impulse in the presence of a terrible danger, he is not lIable
to the plaintiff for the consequences of it." The court: "I will not
charge it exactly in those words. I will charge it that the essence of
the liability must be a voluntary act." The proposition requested to
be charged the defendant was entitled to have submitted to thejury The essence of the liability is not entirely whether the
act of Sage was voluntary or not. An instinctive action may be vol-
untary. An act done upon the spur of the moment, in anticipation
of impending evil, may be voluntary But such acts are not the re-
sult of an intent based upon reasoning; and upon the previous ap-
peal, therefore, we held that, according to the testimony of the plain-
tiff, the jury might find that the act of Sage in placing the plaintiff
between himself and anticipated danger was not an instinctive act,
but rather proceeded from calculation and design. We considered
it manifest that the jury might have come to this conclusion because
116 Id. at 78-79, 52 N.E. at 680-81.
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the defendant expressly refrained from giving the answer which he
had reason to believe would precipitate the catastrophe until he had
placed himself, as he supposed, in a place of comparative safety,
behind the plaintiff..1i
Laidlow v. Sage was tried four times,11 8 the final result being an
out-of-court settlement, but the cream of the late-nmeteenth-century
Boston Bar, including the famed Joseph Choate, participated. Choate,
like almost everyone else, detested Sage and sought vengeance.11 9
Choate's ultimate success, however, accomplished nothing construc-
tive for tort law
The two Appellate Division opinions in the case, nevertheless, do
point up an additional problem of proof for plaintiff which is present
not only m Laidlow but also in Vincent, Noll, and Cordas. How, ex-
cept in terms of jury magic, can a given act reasonably be found
"voluntary" rather than "instinctive" on conflicting and, generally,
equally creditable proof? Yet the Restatement of Torts, reflecting
relevant case law,1 20 regards the distinction as determinative.121 All
of these losses should fall upon the actor. An interesting footnote, how-
ever, is that the Restatement of Torts, while adopting the "instinctive
action" distinction for cases such as Laidlow, apparently rejects it
and would deny liability in duress cases such as the previously men-
tioned Gilbert v. Stone,1 22 where defendant was forced at gun point
to step on plaintiff's land and take plaintiffs gelding. Of course, the
Restaters, like everyone else, would impose liability in any duress
situation where one, threatened with immediate death, premeditatedly
kills another in order to save his own life. 23
117 Laidlow v. Sage, 80 Hun 550, 553, 30 N.Y. Supp. 496, 498-99 (1894).
118 SmRYan, op. cit. supra note 114.
119 Id. at 76-84.
120 The leading case is Scott v. Shephard, 2 Black. W 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773),
3 Wils. K.B. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (K.B. 1773), the so-called "Squib Case."1 21 IRsrATsmmNr (SEcoND), ToR-s § 14 (1965):
Necessity of Act by Defendant.
To make the actor liable for a battery, the harmful bodily contact must be caused
by an act done by the person whose liability is in question. "Comment b" to the above
quoted section reads, in material part, as follows: "Thus, a muscular movement which is
purely reflexive or the convulsive movements of an epileptic are not acts in the sense in
which that word is used n the Restatement. So too, movements of the body during sleep
or while the will is otherwise n abeyance are not acts. An external manifestation of the
will is necessary to constitute an act
122 Sty. 72, 82 Eng. Rep. 539 (K.B. 1648).
12 3 One might attempt to appear very learned about propositions like this, but the
cases, in fact, largely involve extraordinary situations in which people are in rafts in the
middle of the ocean eating one another. Modern cases generally involve some sort of
duress defense to murder n which the defendant says that he had to kill somebody
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Another problem, as the cases, 24 if not the Restatement of Torts,
make clear is that of mixed motives; of whether defendant acted for
himself and/or third persons with whom he stood m some kind of
legal relation (land occupier and licensee, for example), or for a
group of strangers, or for society at large. The Restatement of Torts, to
be sure, draws a rough distinction between "private" and "public
necessity" cases (i.e., one is not liable if he takes another's life or
property for the "public" as contrasted with his own "private" bene-
fit), but to apply the Restatement rule to particular facts is something
else again. Take, for example, two of the Restatement's own "private
necessity" illustrations:
2. A, a pharmacist, refuses to sell B a bottle of medicine available
only from A and necessary to save the life of B.125 B takes the med-
icme and uses it. B is privileged to do so, but is subject to liability
to A for the value of the medicine.
3. The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that B is a physician
who takes the medicine to save the life of his patient. B is privileged
to do so, but is liable to A for the value of the medicine.126
Similar illustrations are given by the Restatement of Restitution.
But the illustrations of neither Restatement, it is submitted, are sup-
portable with reference to practical problems of proof. Furthermore,
one is left at sea, even in terms of meaningful generalized guidance
with respect to what constitutes a "public" as contrasted with a "pri-
vate" necessity What, for example, would the Restaters do with a case
where a volunteer policeman crashes into a drugstore in order to obtain
insulin to save the life of a legally unrelated person known by him to
be a diabetic? Perhaps the volunteer police officer's government should
should be liable to the druggist on just compensation grounds, but to
hold the policeman himself would be a travesty on justice. The best
risk-bearer is the government. At the same time, a cross-action by the
government against the diabetic for the market value of the insulin
and for damage to the drugstore would obviously be justified. This is so
because the diabetic would certainly have taken the action the police
officer did had the diabetic been in a position to do so.
because he was coerced by a third party. See, e.g., State v. Nargashian, 26 R.I. 299, 58
Atl. 953 (1904). See also People v. Matlack, 51 Cal. 2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959).
i24 See, e.g., the Vincent case itself, 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W 221 (1910). Who
can say, on reading such a case, whether the shipowner wanted primarily to save his ship
or his person, or his crew, or merely his cash?
125 The quoted example raises an interesting question of patent law. Many experts
would capsize if somebody perfected a cancer pill.
120RF.STATEMENT (SEcomN), ToRTs § 263 (1965).
2 RErATEMinENT, REsTrTTIoN § 122 (1937).
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Of course, it would be far easier to hold the policeman liable to the
druggist if the policeman broke into the drugstore not only for a
diabetic third party's benefit but also because he, too, was a diabetic
suffering from lack of insulin. But, again, the proof problem would in
most cases be impossible. One could go on endlessly Suppose, for
example, that the policeman was not a diabetic and acted for two
"third persons," or three, or ten, or an entire society of diabetics? This,
at least as regards our hypothetical "diabetic society," is the domain
of the just compensation section which follows.
Before proceeding further, a superficially related group of cases
must be considered and distinguished. Students repeatedly stumble
over such cases and equate them not only with Vincent and like cases
but with Noll as well. A typical illustration of the cases in question
would involve a pleasure car driver non-negligently carrying five guests
to a picnic. A small child suddenly stumbles into the path of his car,
and the driver is confronted with the dilemma of choosing between
killing or seriously manning the child (who might or might not be
negligent) and seriously injuring or killing himself or his guests.
Of course, just as in Peerless and Nol, the respective "certainty"
and "seriousness of danger" percentages as between the car occupants
and the child can be changed, and Farmer Jones' fence can be thrown
in for good measure, so that the child, the driver, and his guests could
all have been saved had the driver only chosen to take the fence. There
is in all of these cases, too, the intriguing matter of who, under varying
circumstances, pays, and to what extent, for the damage sustained by
the driver's car. Such matters are elsewhere discussed. 28 However, a
hypothetical "driver-guest" case fundamentally differs from the basic
problem herein discussed in that it raises the question of an actor's tort
liability when confronted with an emergency necessitating an active,
affirmative choice between third parties and himself and persons with
whom he is associated.
On the other hand, Vincent and the other cases herein considered,
all involve somebody destroying another's life, limb or property where
the plaintiff is passive and in no way-legally, factually or otherwise-
occasions the emergency The dockowner in Vincent, for example,
merely had a dock wholly unrelated to the storm. However, the hypo-
thetical child, whether or not negligent is analogically tantamount to
the unexpected storm involved in Vincent. Both created emergency
situations. To put it another way- The hypothetical driver, in contrast
128 See generally Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REv. 499
(1965).
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to the dockowner in Vincent, who at all times remained passive, was
required to take affirmative action to the detriment of either himself
and/or third parties with whom he was associated.
The leading case on the point is probably Lucchese v. San Fran-
cwco-Sacramento R.R.129 This was a personal injury action against a
railroad and the driver of a truck in which plaintiff was riding when
the truck collided with a tram at a crossing. The principal issue on
appeal was whether the railroad was liable because its motorman failed
to employ an alternative and admittedly quicker means of stopping the
tram. The motorman failed to employ such alternative means because
its use might possibly have thrown some of his passengers to the floor
and injured them, even though its use would have averted the collision.
In holding for defendant railroad, the court stated: "[The motorman's]
reason was sound. The defendant [railroad] owed to its passengers the
first duty, and that was to exercise utmost care for their safety To the
plaintiff it owed the duty of exercising ordinary care. It did so. The
plaintiff may not complain." 30
To put it more bluntly- The railroad in Lucchese appears to have
escaped liability largely because it was a common carner and as such
owed a duty of "extreme" or "utmost" care to its passengers. The nega-
tive implication, of course, is that a priv.ate carner might well have
been liable in Lucchese.
Be this as it may, Lucchese-type cases are here relevant only in that
they involve the "mixed-motives" problem and involve the question of
whether or not the actor's personal interests (or those of third parties)
ought to have weight in determining liability The Lucchese answer is
affirmative, and its principle has even been carried by a few courts to
the point of exonerating drivers who, in order to save themselves and
their cars, drive into and kill persons either negligently or non-negli-
gently present in their paths.-" At the same time, Lucchese and like
cases do involve a significant "mixed-motives" problem and likewise
obliquely support the proposition that the actor (in Lucchese, the
railroad) is not liable even when acting largely n order to save cash.
To this extent, and with the important caveat previously noted,132 the
Lucchese line of cases undercuts Vincent and the various Restatement
of Torts hypotheticals predicated on Vincent. 3
129 106 Cal. App. 242, 289 Pac. 188 (1930), noted, 44 HARv. L. REV. 303 (1930).
13o 106 Cal. App. at 244, 289 Pac. 189.
131 See, e.g., Thurmond v. Pepper, 119 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
132 See text accompanying notes 127-130 supra.
133 See text accompanying notes 123-125 supra.
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Let me now turn to the so-called "anrplane-ground-damage" cases.134
The typical situation involves a non-negligently operated and main-
tamed airplane inexplicably going to grief in the air, so that the pilot
must choose to make his a forced landing m the planted cornfield of
either A or B. The pilot chooses A's cornfield, rather than B's, and
destroys A's corn and farmhouse. The Restatement of Torts, as pre-
viously mentioned,:3 5 makes A, rather than the airline, bear the loss.
This position, it is submitted, is untenable for the reasons above-dis-
cussed and also because A would have the almost insuperable burden
of showing not only that the pilot and/or his airline was negligent but
that the pilot's action was not "instinctive." The frame of reference
here, of course, is Laidlow v. Sage. The legal difference between "in-
stinctive" and "deliberate" action in a forced-landing context, however,
wholly escapes me. There is, on reflection, much to be said for the
ancient trespass cases (rejected by the Restaters) imposing liability
under the aforementioned circumstances. The Restaters, while respond-
ing to economic changes and unposing strict liability in such areas as
products liability,136 unjustifiably and inconsistently get carried away
with fault notions when it comes to farmers and airlines. 13 7
The "fire" cases likewise deserve mention. 8" The typical case here
involves A dynamiting B's house solely in order to save his own from
destruction on account of an onrushing fire. This, according to most
writers139 as well as the Restatement of Torts,140 results in liability Yet
only He knows what the result would be according to the Restaters in
a "small-non-incorporated-town" situation where there are only two
houses, or ten, or fifteen, or where it turns out that the destruction of
A's house, retrospectively viewed, was not necessary to save the ten or
fifteen houses or the entire small non-incorporated town.
The cases, along with the Restatement of Torts, as previously
noted,14' draw a distinction according to whether or not there is a
"public" as contrasted with a "private" necessity Plamtiff proof prob-
134 These cases are exhaustively discussed in RESTATEumNT (SEcoND), ToRTS
§ 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
135 See text accompanying note 64 supra.
13 6 RESTATAENT (SEcoND), ToRTs § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
137 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 520A (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
138 See generally Annot., 14 A.L.I.2d 73 (1950).
139 See, e.g., Hall and Wigmore, Compensation for Property Destroyed to Stop the
Spread of a Conflagration, 1 ILL. L. REv. 501 (1907).
140 The Restatement of Torts, as repeatedly noted in the text, takes the position
throughout that one can seldom, if ever, destroy another's person or property solely or
even principally to save his own without liability.
141 See text accompanying notes 124-127 supra.
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lems here, as in most of the cases heretofore considered, appear in-
superable and for the same reasons.
There is, furthermore, another vital distinction. It is, oddly enough,
one ignored by the vast bulk of the cases' 42 and by the Restatement of
Torts.143 The distinction is between value and no value. Suppose, for
example, A dynamites B's house solely in order to save his own in a
situation where B's house would in any event have been totally de-
molished by an onrushing fire. Liability should not exist. The simple
reason is that B's house, under the circumstances, has a market value
of zero. Who, in his right mind, after all, would pay anything for a
house about to be destroyed by an onrushing fire? The matter is further
explored below
Inseparable from the problem of liability in these cases are various
privilege issues. Students ordinarily ask, for example, whether, on
Vincent facts, the shipowner would legally be entitled to employ force
against the dockowner in the event that the latter sought forcibly to
prevent the strengthening of the cables. Would a druggist, viably avail-
able on the premises, to take the above Restatement of Torts hypo-
thetcals, 44 legally have been justified in using force to prevent the
taking of his insulin?
The answer in all of these cases depends, in the first place, on
whether a privilege to act exists and, in the second, on whether the
amount of force employed was "reasonable." Just one example. Suppose
I non-negligently park my car in front of A's house, and the car in-
explicably bursts into flame. A is at the time twenty feet away watering
his roses with a garden hose. A, because of the "no duty to act" rule,
does not have to assist me. But suppose I forcibly attempt to take his
hose in order to save my car? The legally correct answer (according to
the cases)145 is uncertain, to say the least. However, the position taken
by some courts140 and the Restatement of Torts,147 that the force which
may immediately and lawfully be employed by any 'legally privileged"
person against a "resister" (such as a hypothetical "resisting" dock-
owner in Vincent) even extends (in a "force-meeting-force" situa-
142 The cases are collected m Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 74 (1950).
'
43 This is difficult to understand except on the assumption that most judges and
lawyers have not sufficiently been exposed to classical economics.
144 See text accompanying notes 125-126 supra.
145 No case directly m point was found. As regards the confusion, see Bohlen, In-
complete Prtvilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality,
39 H v. L. 11Ev. 307 (1926).
146 See, e.g., People v. Doud, 223 Mich. 120, 193 N.W 884 (1923).
i47The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS (1965) never expressly makes the point.
It is, however, implicitly made throughout numerous sections.
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tion ) 148 to the taking of life, seems unjustified. In most such cases, the
"trial-judge-]ury" vagaries involved in determining the very existence
of the privilege are too much, to say nothing of practical plaintiff-proof
difficulties.
The privilege problem is further compounded by cases such as
Southern Counties Ice Co. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,149 holding that
a trespasser is virtually liable as an insurer for damage done to the
premises while trespassing. A correlative principle, adopted by the
Restatement of Torts,150 is that persons privileged for some reason to
enter another's land (say, a "non-negligent-deliberate-choice" forced
airplane landing case) are liable for incidental non-intentionally and/
or non-negligently inflicted damages occasioned by their behavior
while on the land. Staying with the forced airplane landing case, for
example, Tentative Draft No. 11 of the Second Restatement of Torts,5'
and many cases152 would lead us to believe that there is no liability on
the part of the airline for non-negligently, though intentionally, de-
stroying A's cornfield in the first place, but that the airline is liable for
the remainder of the cornfield if the pilot, when getting out of his
plane, non-negligently drops a cigarette and burns it. Not surprisingly,
the Restatement is silent regarding the proper result where Officer X
reasonably destroys a fence or breaks down a door in order lawfully
to arrest B's tenant.53 B's door, in contrast to the previously discussed
case of A dynamiting B's house where such house is about to be de-
stroyed by an onrushing fire,'5 4 possesses market value. Unfortunately,
no "breaking down of a door" case was found by this writer. The broad
point simply is that risk-distribution theory is ignored in all of these
cases and the result left either to juryroom vagaries or to unintelligible
148The case hypothesized is one in which slight force is initially employed but where
the fight builds up to the point where it becomes necessany for one combatant to take
hns opponent's life.
14939 F Supp. 157 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
150 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTs §§ 196-197 (1965).
151 RBsTATEAmNT (SEcoND), TORTs § 520A (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965). The distinc-
tion between the principle mentioned in the previous note and the cases referred to in
520A of this note is the Latdlow v. Sage distinction between "deliberative" and "instinc-
tive" action. It is one thing, in other words, for a plane to crash without pilot control
and another where though the plane is out of control, the pilot still has a choice concern-
ing the land upon which he will crash.
152 See ibid. and cases there cited.
153The closest applicable section of the BESTATEmENT (ScoNr)), TORTS (1965) is
§ 204, comment e which appears to immunize the police officer in cases such as those
hypothesized in the text.
154 See text accompanying notes 136-141 supra.
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legal distinctions which take msufficient account of practical proof
problems.
One final group of cases. A modern version of the classic Mouse's
Case155 should be illustrative. Suppose, for example, that I am trans-
porting a heavy object m my boat on Lake Erie. A storm unexpectedly
arises, and it becomes necessary for me either to throw over the heavy
object or to suffer myself and the object to undergo a deep Lake Erie
death. Admiralty law to one side, I am here clearly justified in jettison-
mg the object in order to save myself. This is because the object itself
threatened my life under the circumstances. The case differs from
Vincent in that the dock therein involved was not threatening anybody
An alternative basis for denying liability in a Lake Erie-type case
would be the overlooked distinction referred to above156 in connection
with the "fire" cases. In other words, the heavy object in question,
about to go down in Lake Erie anyway, has no market value. Here, at
least, the Restaters do draw a distinction. The Restatement would un-
pose no liability where the object itself poses the threat and is de-
stroyed in order to avert disaster.157 Conventionally, Mouse's Case and
like cases are dealt with under the heading of "actual public menace."
There are "apparent public menace" cases, too. McGuire v. Amyx 58
is probably the leading authority While dealt with in greater detail
below,159 the case involved a doctor who reasonably but mistakenly
committed plaintiff to a smallpox mstitution. Plaintiff contracted small-
pox and was demed recovery on analogy from "actual public menace"
cases such as Mouse's Case and because of the societal interest involved
in having doctors utilize their best judgment without having to worry
about reasonable mistake of fact problems. McGuire seems wrong.
The doctor is obviously the better risk-bearer. Most McGuire-type cases
will involve government officials. Accordingly, McGuire is principally
dealt with in the just compensation section.
In concluding the torts section, the following points are evident:
(1) The cases, such as they are, cannot be reconciled. (2) Many of
the decisions, albeit sometimes justifiably, do violence to basic fault no-
tions. (3) Risk-distribution theory is almost entirely ignored. (4) Plain-
15512 Co. Rep. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B. 1609).
150 See text accompanyng notes 140-142 supra.
157 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS §§ 262-263 (1965).
158 317 Mo. 1061, 297 S.W 968 (1927). See generally Gray, Prtvate Wrongs of
Public Servants, 47 CALw. L. REv. 303 (1959).
159 See text accompanying notes 220-225 snfra. See also Annot., 12 A.L.R. 249
(1921).
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tiff-proof problems, certainly in terms of conventional decisions, are
impossible. How, for example, can one rationally distinguish between
"instinctive" and "deliberative" action on conflicting proof? (5) Im-
possible "privilege to act" problems abound. (6) The entire area is
characterized by a complete lack of consistent societal policy
Suggested solutions to the above-mentioned problems are not of-
fered at this point. The concluding section contains them, such as they
are.
II. Just Compensation
Much which has gone before is here m one sense necessarily re-
peated. There is, for almost every torts case considered, a relevant and
correlative just compensation clause analogue. To take the most obvi-
ous illustration, the torts problem of whether or not A can lawfully dy-
namite B's house in order to save his own from an onrushing fire with-
out paying °o finds an approximate parallel on the just compensation
side m a case such as United States v. Caltex.16 Government troops m
Caltex dynamited plaintiff's oil refinery in the Philippines during World
War II in order to prevent it from falling into Japanese hands. Caltex is
as much an "actual public menace" case as the fire case above-noted
and can be extended, as was the fire case in the torts section, to cases in-
volving "apparent menaces." To employ Caltex, for example, the
"apparent public menace" just compensation analogue would be a case
which, when retrospectively viewed, involved the unnecessary destruc-
tion of an oil refinery The "constitutionally but erroneously convicted
defendant" case is another "apparent public menace" example. Simi-
larly, on the just compensation side, Vincent and like cases are little,
if any, different from a case in which the government commandeers
my car in order to chase a fleeing felon or drafts me to work on a road
or to put my finger in a dike.
While an historical exegesis of the sovereign immunity doctrine is
at this point indicated, it is not here undertaken. The question has been
exhaustively explored elsewhere.162 Suffice it to say here only that the
160 See text accompanying notes 138-46 supra.
161344 U.S. 149 (1952), noted, 41 GEo. L.J. 422 (1953); 37 MARQ. L. REv. 82
(1953); 51 MicH. L. REv. 739 (1953); 27 N.Y.U.L. RE:v. 503 (1952); 25 So. CAL. L.
REv. 474 (1952); 26 TEmT. L.Q. 103 (1952); 14 U. Prrr. L. REv. 441 (1953).
162 See, e.g., Mitau, What Has Happened to the Study of State Public Law by
Political Scientists?. A Note on Achievements and Lacunae in the Study of State Con-
stitutional Law Since 1950, 14 J. PuB. L. 90 (1965). See also, James, Jr., Tort Liability
of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cni. L. RE:. 610 (1955); Peterson,
Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26 Mnqr. L. REv. 293 (1942).
The question of what constitutes a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth amendment
and corresponding state constitutional provisions is not hereto expressly considered. See
also Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 677 (1948) and Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1961).
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doctrine has repeatedly been invoked on both state and federal levels
in order to deny liability for government behavior wich, if engaged in
by a private citizen, would unquestionably be tortious.' However, it
goes without saying that the sovereign immunity zpse dixit ordinarily
makes little sense in a democratic society and absolutely none in any
"Great Society" where most domestic legitimate legislative efforts are
directed toward socializing the adverse effects of an industrial age.
After all, sovereign immunity was mitially put into Anglo-American
law by the circumstance that England was once an absolute monarchy
Still, sovereign immunity does exist, and a statement concerning its
relationship to the fifth amendment and corresponding state constitu-
tional provisions is necessary On the federal level, of course, the
Tucker Act164 and the federal Court of Claims have to some extent long
taken care of the matter. But the Tucker Act has many limitations, and
the same is true of its state-law counterparts. Furthermore, Tucker-
type statutes have received an extremely hostile judicial reception on
both the state and federal levels.365
Of course, and this point has never sufficiently been made clear,
sovereign imunity doctrine and just compensation recovery are two
sides of the same com. In other words, assuming that the plaintiff does
have a just compensation case, denying liability on a sovereign imu-
nity basis effectually reads out the just compensation clause from any
applicable constitution. The matter has perhaps best been put by the
South Carolina court in a "just compensation" flooding context:
To hold [that the Just Compensation clause is not self-ex-
ecuting] would be to say that the Constitution itself gives the right
which the Legislature may deny by failing or refusing to provide a
remedy Such a construction would indeed make the constitutional
provision a hollow mockery instead of a safeguard for the rights of
citizens 166
It is inconceivable but that, where the Constitution has prescribed
in. unmistakable terms that the property of no citizen shall be taken
for a public use without just compensation, that [other than] a
guarantee that compensation will be made whether the taking be a
political subdivision or by the state itself.167
It would indeed be a travesty upon justice if the State should give
163 Authorities cited note 162 supra.
i6424 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified m scattered sections of 28 U.S.C).
165 See generally Abend, Federal Liability for Takings and Torts: An Anomalous
Relationship, 31 FonniL4m L. Ev. 481 (1963).
I6 Clck Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dept., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842
(1931). See generally Abend, supra note 165.
167 Clck Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, supra note 166, at 502, 157
S.E. at 850.
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by its constitution a right and then deny liability upon the ground that
its Legislature had not provided a remedy by statute waiving ummu-
nity1 68
So far as a conventional torts course is concerned, the Case of the
King's Prerogative tn Saltpetre169 is the decision usually employed as
the vehicle for expounding upon the inter-relationship between torts
and just compensation law and theory Another classic, Saltpetre holds
that the King is liable for taking plamtiffs saltpetre for gunpowder to
be used for the realm's defense notwithstanding that he need not pay
for his technical trespass on plaintiffs land in order to obtain the salt-
petre. Saltpetre was one of the few cases the framers of the fifth
amendment must have had in mmd when drafting it. Thus Saltpetre
and similar cases established from the earliest times that the govern-
ment was legally obligated to pay for property taken, even where that
property was to be used for the benefit of an entire nation.
From Saltpetre and like cases grew the now well-established prin-
ciple that, certainly whenever real property is involved, the govern-
ment must pay when the property is taken for a public purpose whether
in or out of wartime.170 There is an unfortunate problem as to what
constitutes a "takmg."71 Passing this, however, and notwithstanding
occasional judicial statements and decisions to the contrary,172 the
principle m question now clearly covers personalty as well as realty 
7 3
The duPont Corporation, for example, would clearly be entitled to just
compensation recovery for chemicals taken from it by the government
m order to win a war. The case is not very different from Vincent on
the torts side. Unlike tort law, however, conventional just compensa-
tion law inexplicably appears to draw a fundamental distinction be-
tween the taking of "property" and the taking of "personal services." 17 4
168 Id. at 503, 157 S.E. at 850.
169 All the Judges of England, 12 Co. Rep. 12, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (K.B. 1607).
170 Certainly, no member of the United States Supreme Court drew any realty-
personalty distinction in United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
171 See, e.g., Rabm v. Lake Worth Drainage Distnct 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 958 (1956). See generally Abend, supra note 166.
172 James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Offlcers, 22 U. CEm. L.
REv. 610 (1955).
173 See note 170 supra.
174 The United States Supreme Court, however, has never squarely drawn the
distinction. Indeed, United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623 (1871), comes very close to
holding that there is no such distinction and that, assuming plaintiff is otherwise entitled
to recovery, services must be "justly compensated" in the same sense as tangible property.
Id., especially at 630, where the Court speaks of the government's obligation "to renm-
burse the owner for the use of [certain commandeered] steamboats and for his own
services and expenses, and for the services of the crews during the period the steamboats
were employed "
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Thus the Government may draft me into the army and even order me
to almost certain death without paying me a mckel, while duPont's
stockholders at the same time fatten on their chemicals' just compensa-
tion rights. The distinction, to say the least, is an intriguing one, es-
pecially for a "Great Society" professedly dedicated to the proposition
that human and civil-liberties rights are more valuable than property
interests.
But one does not need a "Great Society" program m order to point
up the distinction's absurdity Take, for example, a healthy male adult
citizen, called upon by a fire-department official to help put out a fire.
If the requested assistance extends to the appropriation of the citizen's
water and/or garden hose, just compensation theory (the subsequently
discussed Blackman1 75 case to the contrary) dictates recovery On the
other hand, the commandeered "fire fighting" citizen cannot, under a
conventional just compensation clause analysis, recover against the
government for the reasonable value of his time,176 nor, presumably
(either m tort or in quasi-contract), against the person or company
benefited by his having been commandeered.1 7 7 Here, of course, the
insurer of the fire-engulfed house profits, perhaps unjustifiably, by
government involvement, rather than du Pont's aforementioned stock-
holders. The basic point is simply that, so far as just compensation law
is concerned, property owners get wealthy (even in time of war or fire),
while citizens who have little else but their bodies often lose even them.
It is worse than this. Personalty commandeered as "incidental" to
commandeering a person in order to put out a fire or to chase a fleeing
felon may also be lost if one happens to be in the right place at the
wrong time. The leading case here is Blackman v. City of Cincinnati.178
Blackman involved an Ohio citizen ordered by an Ohio policeman to
employ his car m order to capture a fleeing felon. The police officer got
into plaintiff's car and seated himself at plaintiff's right side, all the
while giving directions. The police officer's directions were bad, and
plaintiff's car was destroyed as a result of the directions and the cir-
175Blackman v. City of Cincinati, 66 Ohio App. 495, 35 N.E.2d 164 (1941),
aft'd, 140 Ohio St. 25, 42 N.E.2d 158 (1942). See text accompanying notes 178-181 infra.
176 See, e.g., Merritt v. American Dock & Trust Co., 59 N.Y. Super. 83, 13 N.Y.
Supp. 234 (1891).
177 E.g., Wheelwright v. Canal Co., 48 La. Ann. 606, 19 So. 591 (1896); Mulligan
v. Kenny, 34 La. Ann. 50 (1882); Watson v. Ledoux, 8 La. Ann. 68 (1853). See also
Kelley v. East Jordan Chem. Co., 162 Mich. 525, 127 N.W 671 (1910); Glenn v. Savage,
14 Ore. 567, 13 Pac. 442 (1887). On the other hand, the Restatement of Restitution
appears to allow recovery for the reasonable value of services non-officiously rendered in
an emergency. RF-STATEmENT, RFSTTrrTON §§ 43, 54, 118, 117 (1937).
178 66 Ohio App. 495, 35 N.E.2d 164 (1941), aff'd, 140 Ohio St. 25, 42 N.E.2d 158
(i942).
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cumstances attendant upon the chase. Plaintiff sued on Ohio Just com-
pensation grounds and lost. The various Ohio courts involved demed
relief on four different grounds: (1) The taking of plaintiff's car was
"incidental" to the commandeering of plaintiff's person, and plaintiff,
for the reasons above stated, was surely not entitled to just compensa-
tion recovery for the value of his services. (2) State police power (a
singularly unhelpful term), was ample justification for what was done.
(3) Ohio had a penal statute, reflecting what was doubtless the
ancient common law rule,179 that every able bodied male adult was
legally obligated to assist in effectuating the arrest of an "outlaw"
(4) "[T]here was no divestiture of title nor any interruption
to [plaintiffs] possession. If the officer had not ridden in the auto-
mobile, there would have clearly been no change in the possession of
the automobile. The fact that [the officer] did ride in [the car] is
immaterial. [Plaintiff] still had possession of [the car] The
use of the automobile resulted from authority over the [plaintiff] and
not from any assertion of title over his property "110
Blackman is interesting for several reasons. In the first place, it
seems wrong. Why should plaintiff Blackman have to pay for society's
interest in crime detection and prevention simply because he had the
misfortune of being present with his car when the police officer needed
help? The government is obviously the better risk bearer, and Black-
man cannot conceivably be squared with the Saltpetre case nor with
the hypothetical duPont and garden hose cases.
Blackman is indefensible for two additional reasons: (1) Mention-
ing and relying upon the Ohio statute in order to deny recovery is
about the same as a cat chasing its own tail. Why an Ohio statutory
obligation to assist police officers in effectuating lawful arrests should
have anything to do with the meaning of the Ohio and federal just
compensation clauses passes all understanding. (2) The intermediate
Ohio court opinion negatively but clearly implies that the result might
have been different had the police officer not entered the car but had
directed Mr. Blackman to chase the fleeing felon by himself. Unfortu-
nately, Blackman appears to be the only reported decision involving
the question under consideration. Shepardizing yielded nothing. It
should also be noted that there was no claim made in Blackman for the
179 See Broeder, Silence and Perjury Before Police Officers, 40 NEB. L. REv. 63
(1960) and authorities cited therein. Compare Goldberg, Misprson of Felony: An Old
Concept n a New Context, 52 A.B.A.J. 148 (1966).
180 Blackman v. City of Cincinnati, 66 Ohio App. 495, 499, 35 N.E.2d 164, 166
(1941).
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reasonable market value of Mr. Blackman's services, for the loss of use
of his car, for gas, or for car-depreciation.
Of course, Mr Blackman's car could have been destroyed in a
variety of ways. For example, the police officer could have shot at it
for the purpose of killing or maiming the felon. Other complications
readily suggest themselves. Blackman, for instance, could have been
guilty of contributory negligence, or the police officer nght have been
negligent had he chosen to drive rather than to direct Mr. Blackman to
do so. All of the aforementioned cases should be decided for plaintiff.
Fault notions appear largely irrelevant in such contexts. It should be
enough for liability that the government is the better risk bearer and
that the plaintiff, even if legally entitled to the reasonable market value
of his time, has independently been discommoded.
How does one rationally square Blackman with Vincent? The
government in Blackman was in a far better position to pick up the tab
than Vincent's shipowner, notwithstanding that the police officer's
behavior in Blackman was unintentional.
The "policeman shooting at fleeing felons" cases must also be noted.
A typical case involves a police officer who lawfully fires at a fleeing
felon but whose bullet fortuitously miscarries, killing an innocent by-
stander and/or destroying an innocent third party's property Tradi-
tional tort law denies recovery is' The most difficult cases in this
connection involve "volunteer policemen," 18 2 for it is harder accurately
to ascertain their real purpose in flnng than is true in the case of either
professional police officers or private citizens. The weight of modem
torts case law weighs almost equally heavy on the side of no liability
in cases where police officers, reasonably mistaken regarding the dan-
gerous fleeing felon status of persons at whom they ain and fire, hit
such persons, who subsequently prove to be innocent of any wrong-
doing.183
Just compensation law currently deies relief against the govern-
ment in all of the aforementioned cases on one or another variety of
the several theories employed by the Oho courts in Blackman, or on a
straight sovereign immunity basis. In contrast to Blackman, however,
"fleeing felon" cases denying recovery ordinarily lay heavy stress on
the non-culpable nature of the policeman's action. The innocent victims
of fortuitously miscarrying bullets as well as persons shot because
reasonably although mistakenly suspected of being dangerous fleeing
181 RESTAT (SEcoND), Tonrs § 75 (1965).
182 No case m point was found.
1 8 3 REEsTAimdENT (SEcoND), TonRTs § 137 (1965).
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felons are traditionally viewed for just compensation purposes as "inci-
dental" unfortunate by-products of the police-power right to shoot in
the first place.
Strangely enough, the conventional crminmal law result in the "for-
tuitously-Miscarrymg-bullet-bystander" problem is to hold the police-
man for manslaughter or perhaps even murder, at least in situations
where he intentionally shoots at and kills a person reasonably suspected
by him of having committed a dangerous felony but who in fact has
not. 84
In contrast, the Model Penal Code, takes a consistent position in
denying crnminal liability in all of the aforementioned cases.Y85 Just
compensation law likewise denies recovery in all such cases. Nor is the
innocent victim's case better from a just compensation standpoint if
the police officer and, a fortiori, any private citizen, fires at and kills or
injures persons or property under negligently acquired beliefs which, if
true, would lawfully have justified the use of deadly force.'
Dillon v. United States,18 7 of course, is no "fleeing felon" case. It
lacks an emergency context, for one thing. Dillon approximates the
taking of Blackacre for an interstate highway in that Blackacre (like
the lawyer's services in Dillon) is taken deliberately Of course, Dillon
differs from both the "fleeing felon" and eminent domain highway cases
in that it involves the taking of personal services. 8 "Personal services"
cases are further discussed below But it is no justification for com-
mandeering a lawyer's knowledge and/or experience to say that
lawyers have it or them and that society direly needs lawyers. It is,
furthermore, difficult to understand a democratic and enlightened legal
system in which a lawyer's knowledge and experience take second
place to real or personal property or why a lawyer is less entitled to
constitutional protection than an alien working in a restaurant. I have
always thought that Truax v. Ratch'89 established beyond doubt that
the right to work for a living is a form of property right, entitled to con-
'
84 Petne v. Cartwnght, 114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W 297 (1902); Commonwealth v.
Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946). See generally MonLArnm, MonMMr
Cm~NAL PNocEDuRE 28-48 (1959).
185 See MoDEL PmrAL CODE § 2.04 (Proposed Ofilcial Draft, 1962).
186 See MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 184 at 23 ff.
187 230 F Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964). See text accompanying notes 22-35 supra.
188 See text accompanying note 164 supra. There is yet another distinction, probably
best put by Professor James, Jr.. "The constitutional provision is held not to cover per-
sonal injury or wrongful death." James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and
Their Offlcers, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 610, 619 (1955). Professor James also had much to
say concerning the fifth amendments "taking" concept. Id. at 618.
189 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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stitutional protection. It follows that "services" are "property" in a fifth
amendment sense and that they cannot be taken for the "public
benefit" or otherwise without paying reasonable market value. 90 In-
deed, the taking of a lawyer's knowledge and experience as in Dillon
is a fortiori from the aliens involved in Truax in that only one lawyer
is involved, whereas it was an entire community (z.e., the entire, and
relatively large, alien community) in Truax. The fact that the lawyer
is being appropriated for the public benefit cannot be avoided by say-
mg, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals chose to do,191 that the
lawyer, by reason of his bar admittance oath, owes a duty to the courts
and society simply because he is a lawyer. Apply such reasoning to an
interstate highway Such reasoning would be a ice way to reduce
highway construction costs, too, but I dbubt whether even the most
socialistic-minded would seriously argue that such a practice could be
squared with the just compensation clause.
The Dillon situation is a fortiori for still another reason. If we say
that lawyers who are pressed into public service to defend persons
accused of crime are not entitled to just compensation recovery as
contrasted with people who have their land taken for an interstate
highway, we necessarily say that we value land more than we do the
defense of persons accused of crime. Thus far, unfortunately, only a few
state courts have seen this.192 Most states and the federal government-
the Kennedy Bill is woefully madequate' 93 -still think that the entire
matter is one of legislative grace.1 4 Indeed, many states do not even
have a Kennedy-type statute, and lawyers appointed to defend, no
matter how unpopular the cause, are not entitled to anything, notwith-
standing that the cause which they are appointed to-represent may
financially and otherwise destroy them and their families. Being able
to go to work for the American Civil Liberties Umon on account of
such a sacrifice is, for most lawyers, not adequate recompense.
ig0 See note 174 supra. Probably the best statement of the point is to be found in
Cray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 182, 97 N.W 663, 667 (1903)- "A
person's occupation or calling, by means of which he earns a livelihood and endeavors
to better his condition, and to provide for and support htnself and those dependent upon
him, is property within the meaning of the law, and entitled to protection as such; and
as conducted by the merchant, by the capitalist, by the contractor or laborer, is, aside
from the goods, chattels, money, or effects employed therewith, property in every
sense of the word."
'91 United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
102 Most of the cases are from Indiana and predicated on an unusual type of just
compensation clause. The leading case is Blythe v. Sfate, 4 Ind. 525 (1853).
iDs See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
194 See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
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Doctors do not fare well either. Suppose, for example, an epidemic
in an isolated Alaskan town. In the town there are doctors and a drug-
store possessing the medicines necessary to quell the epidemic. Under
existing just compensation cases, the doctors in question may constitu-
tionally be drafted without pay, whereas not a single pill can be taken
without "justly compensating" the druggist. In these days, of course,
such situations seldom arise, and so doctors are seldom drafted in tins
manner. In contrast, thousands of lawyers are drafted every day to
defend persons accused of crime. It is an ironic commentary upon our
profession that various medical associations hire us to pass their so-
called "Good Samaritan"1 5 statutes and otherwise to help them while
we seem unable to help ourselves.
After observing that coniemporary just compensation law deies
recovery to court-appointed attorneys and to physicians caught up by
epidemics, we should hardly be surprised to find that persons can be
commandeered without pay in order to repair dikes, to put out fires,
and to chase fleeing felons and perhaps even misdemeanants as in the
days of Richard I 11 96 Posse comitatus and "public necessity" remain as
infallible legal foundations for the denial of government liability in any
and all such cases. It is submitted, just to take the fleeing felon case,
that this makes no sense for 1966. The apprehension of criminals, even
those fleeing from the scenes of their crines, is too delicate and sophis-
ticated an undertaking for persons untrained in law enforcement. The
United States is no longer principally made up of frontier communities.
It used to be, in frontier days, that we called upon every able-
bodied citizen to work on roads for a certain number of days each year.
I seriously doubt today, however, that the legal hangover of this and
related rules (currently typified, for example, by the Nebraska stat-
ute' 17 imposing a head or poll tax on men between 21 and 50 on the
sole ground that this is in lieu of their "road working" responsibilities),
would or should pass federal constitutional muster. Frontier roads are
no longer needed. Highways today prlmarilyneed engineers, and there
are unfortunately too many able-bodied unemployed men around to do
the manual labor required without picking on the 21-50 male citizenry
195 See Note, 41 NEB. L. REv. 609 (1962) and authorities therein cited.
190 See Note, The Prtvate Personrs Duty to Asstt the Police in Arrest, 13 Wyo. L. J.
72 (1958) and authorities therein cited.
197 "Each city of the first class shall provide that all male residents there, between
the ages of 21 and 50 years shall be notified to appear and perform two days'
labor on the streets of said city Provided, all persons so notified may commute
the labor so required by the payment of three dollars "NEB. REV. STAT. § 16-710
(1962).
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as a whole. Constitutional objections to statutes of the Nebraska type
are sufficiently obvious to obviate discussion.
This is not to say that citizens have no responsibility to their govern-
ments. There must, on the other hand, be an independent justification
if they are to be commandeered without pay Jury service would be a
case in point. The jury system's basic premise is that people in trouble
are constitutionally entitled to be judged by their peers rather than by
often-cymcal law-trained persons. 98 Furthermore, it is estimated that
there are approximately one million jury trials in the United States each
year. 99 We may well be affluent, as Professor Galbraith suggests, but
we are not yet in a position to pay just compensation for the loss of time
of the thousands of higher wage-bracket people we must have in order
to keep the jury system functioning properly
The Selective Service Act is a slightly different story As mentioned
in the Introduction,200 this is one of the problems encountered on a
particularly bad teaching day A typical question on such a day is why,
if a man may not constitutionally be required by his government to
work on the roads without pay, he may nevertheless be drafted into
the army without pay and even be sent to his death. The answer, un-
fortunately, is not simply any clear-cut analogy to the above-discussed
jury-service cases. At least not now
Soldiering in an atomic age is largely professional. We need citizen
soldiers, to be sure, as witness Viet Nam, but it is still natural for
students to wonder why only comparatively few citizens are called
upon in this connection and are then, by legislative grace, paid barely
enough to live on.2° ' Married men with children are currently exempted
198 See generally Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Requirement: An Empzrcal
Look, 48 NEB. L. REv. 99 (1966); Broeder, The Functions of the jury: Facts or Fictions?,
21 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 386 (1954).1 9 0 See ZmsEr, KALV N & BucmmoHz, DELAY IN =in CourTs (1959).
200 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
201 As beanng upon the fairness though not, of course, on the constitutionality of
the Selective Service Act, an attempt was made authoritatively to determine: (a) How
many men are required to support one fighting man in the field; (b) The extent to which
a soldier's compensation in the form of wages, food, clothing, etc., actually compensates
him as contrasted with traditional pecumary compensation; and (c) Whether or not
the conscnption of women to replace men currently supporting field combat forces
would be practical.
An extremely land, but unfortunately unintelligible letter, dated October 18, 1964,
was received by me from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The letter is on file at
the Umversity of Toledo Law School, but it would serve no useful purpose to quote it
here.
The constitutionality of the draft was settled for all time by the Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1917). See also, Commers v. United States, 66 F Supp. 943 (D.
Mont. 1946) and cases cited therein.
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from the draft, and there are a host of physical, mental and professional
exemptions. We presently do not call upon women, nor is there any "in
lieu of service" tax levied upon the exempt. Still, the various Selective
Service Act mequities, however appalling from a layman's equal pro-
tection standpoint, scarcely fall within the scope of the fifth amend-
ment. This is not to minimize the numerous inequities. Indeed, they
bear stressing, especially in view of the Negro leadership's complaint
that we are currently drafting a disproportionately large number of
Negroes.202 However justified this last complaint may be (and in some
Selective Service Districts there is doubtless an arguable equal protec-
tion problem as regards Negroes), the fact remains that, given the
necessity for citizen soldiers, we sinply are not now in an economic
position to pay "just compensation" wages for the thousands of mdi-
viduals required for our armies.
The cases of filling out tax and social security forms are explicable
in the same terms and are obviously a fortiori from the draft and jury
service cases.
The witness cases are harder. Currently, just compensation law does
not require that any "ordinary" (e.g., an innocent bystander) witness
The most recent case involving the constitutionality of the Selective Service Act,
and probably the most interesting, is United States v. Mitchell, 246 F Supp. 874 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965). The case involves, inter alia, the question of the constitutional duty of one
drafted to serve in an undeclared war, i.e., Viet Nam. The case is further interesting in
the light of the sentence imposed upon the defendant:
It is the strong recommendation of tls Court, and I underscore "strong
recommendation" in a most emphatic way, that no parole be considered by the
Federal Parole Board at any time unless and until Mr. Mitchell [the defendant]
unequivocally assures the Parole Board of his intention to report for induction
into the Armed Forces of the United States. In other words, while the ultimate
discretion is with the Parole Board as a matter of law, for whatever the recom-
mendation of this Court may be worth, it is the intention of this Court that the
full maximum penitentiary term provided by statute, that is, five years, be
served unless the defendant, after serving for 18 months, makes clear his inten-
tion to report for induction.
In addition to the penitentiary sentence which I have just imposed, the
Court orders that you pay a committed fine in amount of five thousand dollars.
It is ordered that the fine be paid forthwith. And of course, being a committed
fine, you may not be released until it is paid. Id. at 908.
The committed fine aspect of the sentence, I would be prepared elsewhere to argue,
is probably unconstitutional under the eighth amendment. See generally Broeder &
Merson, Robinson v. California: An Abbreviated Study, 3 Am. Cmnm. L.Q. 203 (1965).
The most exhaustive conventional legal study of Selective Service Act problems is
probably Annot., 142 A.L.R. 1510 (1943).
202 There is no doubt, of course, that a disproportionately large number of Negroes
are drafted. Prejudice may play a part in certain sections of the country but the presence
of so many Negroes in our arnues is largely explained by the fact that much of the Negro
community is unable to qualify for the various and sundry Selective Service Act exemp-
tions.
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be paid. Society simply cannot afford it. The jury service cases fuirnlish
the most appropriate analogy There are simply too many trials.
The expert witness, however, both historically 20 3 and currently,20 4
presents more of a problem. The courts are presently divided on
whether or not the expert witness is entitled to just compensation re-
covery 205 The expert witness case differs from the Dillon situation in
that it involves only a temporary taking of time and no final responsi-
bility for the results of the trial. Comparatively few witnesses weep as
contrasted with losing lawyers. For those interested in counting cases,
however, the majority view is that expert witnesses are not entitled to
just compensation recovery, even when summoned to testify in their
field of expertise and solely because of it. Many reasons have been
assigned to explain this, but the main one has always been that people
are people and that experts under subpoena are no different from any-
one else under subpoena. The majority reasoning is that an expert as
well as a non-expert can witness a murder and should be treated no
differently 206 This is true, so far as it goes. There are, of course, many
trials and witnesses. The difference is that experts are sometimes picked
on simply because they are experts.207 The distinction was obvious
enough to be noted specious as early as the Thirteenth Century
In the very early days of English practice it was customary to pay
lawyers and physicians and possibly clericals and statesmen, or others
competent from position or study to give expert tetimony in a case,
extra compensation for such services. And it is quite evident that the
statute of 5 Eliz. Ch. 9 merely formulated this pre-existing custom by
providing that witnesses should be paid according to their counte-
nance and calling, a reasonable sum. 208
And the early practice referred to was firmly and finally established
for modem English law by Mr. Justice Maule's opinion in Webb v.
203 See the many authorities cited in Bomar, Jr., The Compensation of Expert Wit-
nesses, 2 LAw & Cormi.a,. PROB. 510 (1935).
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid. See also, 8 WiGmonE, EviDENcE § 2203 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Annot.,
77 A.L.R.2d 1182 (1961); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 1457 (1922).206 See authorities cited in note 207 tnfra.
2 0 7 See generally Bomar, Jr., The Compensation of Expert Witnesses, 2 LAw & Cox-
TEMP. PROB. 210 (1935); Finkelstem, Cost of the Expert in Civil Litigation, 2 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 324 (1951); Lobingier, Compensation of Expert Witnesses, 59 Am. L. REv. 266
(1925); Porterfield, The Right to Subpoena Expert Testimony and the Fees Required to
be Paid Therefor, 5 HAST NGs L.J. 50 (1953); Effective Expert Testimony and Compen-
sation for Expert Witness-a Symposium, 2 J. FoR. Sci. 73 (1959). See also Expert
Witness Fees-Protection for the Indigent Party, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 106, 43 J. Cunr. L.,
C. & P.S. 777 (1953). People v. Dowdle, 16 N.Y.2d 1037, 213 N.E.2d 320, 265 N.Y.S.2d
912 (1965), is probably the most recent case.208 Bomar, Jr., supra note 203 at 513, n.19.
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Page,20 9 decided in 1843. The expert witness compensation problem is,
of course, but a minor version of the just compensation problem pre-
sented by such cases as Dillon. The United States Supreme Court has
yet to speak on the question.
Dillon and expert witness cases aside, however, probably the most
indefensible abuse of the just compensation clause involves material
witnesses. For present purposes it is enough to define a material witness
as one who has observed a crime. Material witnesses may not only be
arrested and committed to jail 210 but, unlike every other arrested person
save one charged with a capital offense (and even this only where the
"presumption of guilt" is strong), are not even entitled to liberty on
bond. The matter will not further be explored here except to note that
even the material witness is not currently entitled to just compensation
recovery This is far worse than Dillon, and, again, the United States
Supreme Court has thus far declined to speak.
One further point. There are many cases (decided both before and
after Griffin v. Illinois)21 to the effect that an indigent criminal de-
fendant is entitled to out-of-state witnesses only where he tenders the
statutory witness and mileage fees in advance.1i Such cases are ob-
viously bad under Griffin but are rendered even more indefensible in
light of the aforementioned just compensation cases denying m-state
witness fees altogether. To put it in another way- If the government is
under no constitutional obligation to reimburse even an m-state wit-
ness, how can it constitutionally compel an indigent criminal defendant
to pay for an extra-state witness merely on the ground that the govern-
ment has passed a witness-fee-mileage statute?
As previously noted, the "actual public menace" and "apparent
public menace" problems are, almost by definition, found in the just
209 1 Carr. & K. 23, 174 Eng. Rep. 695 (N.P. 1843).
210 See Note, Confining Material Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 20 WAsr. & Lan L.
REv. 164 (1963) and authorities cited therein. Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d
Cir. 1966) is also interesting in this regard. The court held, Judge Moore dissenting,
that compelling a mental defective to work sixteen hours a day, six days a week,
violated the thirteenth amendments involuntary servitude clause notwithstanding that
various defendant psychiatrists asserted that such treatment was physically and psy-
chiatcally indicated. While the court conceded that some work programs were consti-
tutionally permissible in the case of mental defectives and, a fortiori, convicted felons,
the court thought that New York had simply gone too far. Compare Stone v. City of
.Paducah, 120 Ky, 322, 86 S.W 531 (1905).
211 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See generally Schafer, Federalism and State Criminal Pro-
cedure, 70 Htnv. L. REv. 1 (1956). Griffin, of course, holds that an indigent criminal
defendant cannot constitutionally be effectively demed the right of appeal solely on
account of his poverty, and thus must be furnished a free transcript.
212 See, e.g., Vore v. State, 158 Neb. 222, 63 N.W.2d 141 (1954).
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compensation area. Little need be said about them here. Insofar as
"actual public menaces" are concerned, they may obviously be abated
under the police power.213 The nuisance cases are probably the closest
in point.21" 4 Any person or object which in fact endangers the public
must obviously be free government prey This is simply Mouse's Case215
revisited on the just compensation side. It is also the previously men-
tioned United States v. Caltex216 where the United States Supreme
Court held that the government was not constitutionally obligated to
pay Caltex for the dynamiting of its oil refineries to prevent them from
falling into enemy hands. It may be significant, however, that a Scottish
court recently held otherwise on almost identical facts.217
Many other "actual public menace" cases could be put, but Har-
rison v. Wisdom213 is probably the best example as regards just com-
pensation. General Sherman's troops, while marching through the
Southland, came upon a small town apparently populated largely by
distillers. The town council ordered all liquor destroyed, and plaintiff, a
liquor dealer, sued defendant, a government official, for having de-
stroyed his liquor. Recovery was deied on the basis that the liquor
was, under the circumstances, an "actual public menace." In other
words, plaintiff's liquor, if not destroyed, would certainly have found
its way into the stomachs of Northern troops to the obvious detriment
of the town's women and property
The "apparent public menace" cases are as difficult on the just com-
pensation side as on the torts side. So far as torts law is concerned, the
reader will recall that the take-off was McGuire v. Amyx, 19 where a
doctor was exonerated after erroneously but non-negligently institu-
tionalizing a person reasonably thought to possess smallpox.
For present purposes, the major problem is in the area of the "con-
stitutionally but erroneously convicted defendant." Contemporary just
compensation law demes hun relief. The analogy here is to McGuire v.
Amyx.220 Of course, certain states and the federal government have
statutes granting some relief.22' But the relief in question is in all cases
2 13 This is a legal trusm.
214 See generally RESTATEmENT (S.corD), TORTs §§ 160(b), 202, 203, 264(2),
265(b) (1965).
215 12 Co. Rep. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B. 1609).
216 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
217 Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate, [1962] Scots L.T.R. 347.
21e 7 Heisk. 99 (Tenn. 1872).
219317 Mo. 1061, 297 S.W 968 (1927).
220 Ibid.
221 The federal statutes bearing on the question are 28 U.S.C. §§ 2513, 1495 (1964).
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pitiful, and the just compensation clause for some reason is never in-
voked by anybody m interpreting them.222 As the late Professor Bor-
chard's research and writing show,223 and as Jeremy Bentham long ago
wrote,224 to deny liability in tis situation is incredible. As the Rhode
Island court recently put it in granting relief pursuant to a legislative
resolution authorizing payment to a material witness:
Liberty is precious beyond compare. Indeed, it was once elo-
quently proclaimed, at a critical moment of our country's history that
life itself would be too dear if purchased at the price of chains and
slavery To the innocent even a momentary deprivation of liberty
is intolerable; 158 days is an outrage. Confinement of the plaintiff for
so long a period among criminals and forcing hun to wear prison garb
added the grossest insult to injury. Such maltreatment cannot be
fully compensated for by pecumary damages. However, the general
assembly has recognized the justice of at least a token satisfaction..
should be far more substantial than $1,250. After careful consideration
of the evidence and bearing in mind the privilege nature of the
222 It should also be noted that statutes granting recovery to "constitutionally-but-
erroneously-convicted-defendants" are very strictly construed. See, e.g., Rigsbee v. United
States, 204 F.2d 70 (App. D.C. 1953); State v. Clements, 319 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958). Compare State v. DeKeyser, 138 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1965). See generally
Annot., 161 A.L.R. 346 (1946).2 23BoRcHpi, CoNvicrINc THE INNocENT (1932); Borchard, Governmental Lia-
bility in Tort, 26 CAN. B. REv. 399 (1948); Borchard, State Indemnity for Efforts of
Criminal Justice, 21 B.U.L. REv. 201 (1941); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort,
34 YA.LE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27), 28 COLVM.
L. REv. 577, 734 (1928). See also ALmN, LAw AND ODEns 356 (2d ed., 1956); FR&Nx
& FRANKc, NOT GUrLT-Y (1957). The most recent study is Bratholm, Compensation of
Persons Wrongfully Accused or Convicted in Norway, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1961)
and the accompanying note at 845. The Bratholn article and the note raise questions:
whether, for example, there ought to be a distinction in "erroneously" convicted defen-
dants' cases according to the way in which a given defendant is ultimately exonerated.
Many such distinctions have been drawn in Scandinavian countries and, as Ambassador
Goldberg, then, of course, Mr. Justice Goldberg, recently pointed out: "[Wle can learn
much from the Scandinavian countries [in these respects]." Goldberg, EQUAIT
AND GovErumNTArL AcTioN, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205, 223 (1964).
2 24 As Borchard describes the history:
In England, Jeremy Bentham was the first champion of the doctrine of state in-
demnification for errors of criminal ]ustice. He considered the obligation of the
state so obvious that any attempt to demonstrate it could only obscure it. On
May 18, 1808, Samuel Romilly, an apostle of criminal law reform in England,
introduced a bill in Parliament leaving it to the trial court to determine whether,
if any, and how much indemnity is due to an innocent individual acquitted after
an unjust conviction. Solicitor General Plumer opposed the bill on the ground
that it created a distinction between those acquitted with and without the
approval of the judge, and declared this a task equally dangerous and uncon-
stitutional. The bill was withdrawn and no attempt has since been made in
England to regulate the question
Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 3 J.
Cam. L., C. & P.S. 684, 691 (1913).
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plamtiffs cause of action we are of the opinion that $2,500 would
more nearly approximate fair and reasonable compensation. 2 5
This brings us back to Giacczo v. Commonwealth.20 There, it will
be recalled, Pennsylvania compelled an acquitted misdemeanant to
pay his own court costs. Although, as previously stated, the case was
reversed on its particular facts by the United States Supreme Court, it
raises the far more important question, curiously ignored in the large-
scale academic debate over the propriety of Gideon v. Waznrght,227 of
whether it is constitutional to require any defendant, however wealthy,
to pay his own lawyer.228 There is nothing judicially authoritative on
the point. Law review writers, other than Mr. Justice Goldberg,229 have
also thus far been silent. There is, accordingly, little anywhere on
whether legal distinctions exist according to whether a given defendant
is acquitted by a judge or jury or has had his conviction upset either
by the trial court, an intermediate appellate state court, a state supreme
court, the United States ,Supreme Court, or a federal district court or
circuit court of appeals in a habeas corpus context. And so forth.
Though not here directly involved, one cannot possibly, whatever
the context, bring up such a matter without observing that the logic of
cases such as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Giacczo case compel a
convicted murderer sentenced to the gas chamber to pay for his own
pellets.230
225 Quince v. State, 94 R.I. 200, 205, 179 A.2d 485, 487 (1962).
226 415 Pa. 139, 202 A.2d 55 (1964), rev'd sub. nom. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 86
Sup. Ct. 518 (1966). Counsel for Giaccio expended $7,500 in connection with one post-
trial motion and with the various appeals. Counsel's time was then budgeted at twenty-
five dollars per hour. Telephone conversation with counsel, Feb. 8, 1966.
227372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 28 This is a matter falling within the "$30 or 30 days" category. That is, it has for
so long been commonplace to require criminal defendants, even acquitted ones, to pay
their own lawyers, that almost everyone assumes that there is nothing constitutionally
wrong with the practice. Yet any protracted criminal case can financially destroy even
a wealthy man. Society should constitutionally be forced to pay on a just compensation
basis, certainly as regards any acquitted defendant.
220 Even if we choose not to go as far as the Scandinavian countries, we should
certainly consider adopting procedures whereby persons erroneously charged
with crime could be reimbursed for their expenditures in defending against the
charge. Without such procedures, acquittal may often be almost as ruinous to
the defendant and his family as conviction. At the very least we should extend
our provision of free legal services in criminal cases to include many hardwork-
ing people who, although not indigent, cannot, without extraordinary sacrifice,
raise sutcient funds to defend themselves or a member of their family against
a criminal charge.
Coldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205, 224 (1964).
230 The problem is exhaustively discussed in Note, Criminal Costs Assessment in
Missouri Without Phyme or Reason, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 76.
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The zoning cases remain. As stated in the Introduction, torts stu-
dents persistently want to know why it is that a government must payjust compensation recovery for taking my land for an interstate high-
way but does not have any legal obligation to pay for zoning my non-
obnoxious business out of existence when neighborhood conditions
change and sometimes even when they do not. The cases on the point
in the United States Supreme Court are, as previously adumbrated,231
ireconcilable. A recent reconciliation attempt, however, was under-
taken by Professor Sax.282 And it makes excellent sense. The distinction
is this: The government need only pay just compensation recovery
when it takes one's property for its own benefit. A government is not
liable where it takes property primarily in order to adjust conflicting
claims among citizens. In other words, a government, acting for itself,
must pay for taking my land for its school but need not pay for pro-
hibiting me from raising horses on my farm. In the horse raising case
the government- acts, not for its own primary benefit, but rather in
order to protect the rights of adjacent land owners. Horses, after all,
do smell. To put it in another way" The government, when it takes my
land for a school, does so for society's benefit. Rezoning my farm
property, on the other hand, is simply a means by which the govern-
ment adjusts my rights vis-a,-vis the rights of my neighbors who wish
to erect 100,000 dollar houses. To be sure, as Professor Sax admits, 233
the cases are difficult to reconcile.
M. Conclusion
Any broad and finalized statement here would be inappropriate.
Nevertheless, the following points bear mention: (1) just compensa-
tion and tort law issues are inextricably intertwined. (2) Risk-distribu-
tion theory should, but does not currently, explain either tort or just
compensation cases. (3) Both groups of cases are internally mcon-
sistent as well as mconsistent vis-a-vis the other. (4) Both groups of
cases appear, at least sometimes, to draw an unjustifiable distinction
between the rich and the poor. (5) It will take judicial constitutional
interpretation in order to rectify the problems herein discussed. Legis-
latures, unfortunately, if past performance is any criterion, cannot in
this area by relied upon.
2 3 1 See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
232 Sax, Taktngs and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
233 Id. at 37.
